Here, we aim to intervene in contemporary discussions of norms and values in economics by relying on our reconstruction of Walras’s project.
Our first step consists in evaluating Pareto’s dismissal of Walras’s conception of normativity and the consequences of this dismissal for economics. To facilitate this appraisal, we will reconstruct the exact link between Pareto and the Paretian tradition in welfare economics. We will then focus on critical appraisals of the Paretian tradition that deal with elements equally present in welfare economics and Pareto’s writings on economics. This appraisal will allow us to demonstrate that although accepted by numerous economists in the early twentieth century, the theoretical and philosophical foundations of Pareto’s rejection of Walras’s incorporation of normative considerations into economics suffer from significant shortcomings. On the other hand, we will equally rely on those parts of Pareto’s rejection judged solid and relevant to improve the position of Walras.
Our second step assumes a deliberately retrospective take, investigating Walras’s project through the prism of contemporary discussions of normative questions in economics. Indeed, since the time of Walras, those working on normative economics and the philosophy of economics have made significant contributions to the discussion of values and norms in economics (social choice theory, the capability approach), the ontological specificities of collective and social entities and the role of individuals therein, and the epistemological particularities of scientific and theoretical examinations of norms and values, especially regarding the role of values and norms in science and the relationship between epistemic values on the one hand and ethical values and social norms on the other. We will situate the ontological, epistemological, and theoretical aspects of the Walrasian project within these more recent discussions in the philosophy of economics and normative economics and rely on these newer developments to update and improve those aspects of Walras’s project that have not survived Pareto’s critique.
As already mentioned, one of the most impressive features of Walras’s project is his attempt to deal with all three aspects of the problem posed by values and norms in economics, i.e., ontological, epistemological, and theoretical. In contrast, contemporary discussions often focus on only one of these aspects. By situating the ontological, epistemological, and theoretical contributions of Walras’s project within contemporary discussions, we aim to rely on Walras to re-establish the link that should prevail between the three different aspects. Still, besides allowing us to articulate the three levels of analysis, Walras also made ingenious and precise contributions to each of them. Thus, we intend to use Walras’s insights to extend the path opened up in contemporary normative economics by Sen, Mongin and Kolm.
Walras’s was one of the last rigorous attempts in economics to systematically combine ontological, epistemological, and theoretical reflections to appraise and evaluate values and norms. Given the continuing relevance of his approach, we find its renewal can offer, if not a fully-fledged theoretical framework, at least, to use a Kantian term, the ontological, epistemological, and theoretical conditions of possibility for renewed objective studies of values and norms in economics.