|le savoir vivant|

tolerance, sociability and solidarity in scottish philosophy

8-10 March 2019

University of Lausanne
Extranef rooms 126 and 118-1

WEBSITE:
http://wp.unil.ch/tolerance/issp-conference-2019/

ORGANISERS:

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Institute for the Study of Scottish Philosophy

FNSNF Swiss National Science Foundation

UNIL | Université de Lausanne
Section de philosophie

1. Conference programme

Friday 8 March

1pm: Room 126 *Reception and registration*
1.40-2.00pm: Room 126 *Opening remarks*
2-3.30pm: Room 126 *Plenary 1* – Broadie
3.30-4pm: Room 221 *Break*
4-5.30pm: Room 126 *Parallel session 1* – Santori & Bee
4-5.30pm: Room 118.1 *Parallel session 2* – Roulin & Carroll
5.30: *End*

Saturday 9 March

9.30-11am: Room 126 *Plenary 2* J. – Taylor
11-11.30am: Room 221 *Break*
11.30-1pm: Room 126 *Parallel session 3* – Buttle & Etchegaray
11.30-1pm: Room 118.1 *Parallel session 4* – McHugh & Shrock

1-2-30pm: *Lunch*

2.30-4pm: Room 126 *Plenary 3* – Carey
4-4.30: Room 221 *Break*
4.30-5.15pm: Room 126 *Parallel session 5* – Heydt
4.30-5.15pm: Room 118.1 *Parallel session 6* – Boeker
5.15-6pm: Room 126 *G. Graham Prize talk* – Galvagni
6pm: *End*

8pm: Dinner

Sunday 10 March

9.30-11am: Room 126 *Parallel session 7* – Agnesina & Lemmens
9.30-11am: Room 118.1 *Parallel session 8* – Edwards & Bergont
11-11.30am: Room 221 *Break*
11.30-1pm: Room 126 *Plenary 4* – Graham
1pm: Room 126 *Concluding remarks*

2. Papers (in order of presentation)

Plenaries

Alexander Broadie
University of Glasgow

The Declaration of Arbroath in the Shadow of Scotus

The talk will contain a substantial historical element contextualising the Declaration of Arbroath. It will then present the message of the Declaration and will demonstrate that the Declaration is a Scotistic document.The talk will also suggest that other leading Scottish thinkers up to the Reformation were committed to that same Scotistic political doctrine that is found in the Declaration.

Jacqueline Taylor,
University of San Francisco

Hume and Smith on Resentment, Sympathy, and the Complexity of Human Sociability

Both David Hume and Adam Smith regard resentment as an emotion important for both self-esteem and justice. We expect resentment from someone whose legitimate expectations (particularly rights) have been disregarded or violated. Moreover, our capacity for empathy with another's resentment plays a crucial role in the development of justice: for Hume, extending the scope of those entitled to the liberties that justice protects, and for Smith, contributing to the grounds for punishment of wrongdoing. I defend Smith and Hume on the importance of resentment, placing my analysis in the context of a larger recent debate prompted by Martha Nussbaum's argument against an appropriate role for anger in furthering justice or combating injustice.

Daniel Carey
NUI (Galway)

Francis Hutcheson and the Question of Religious Toleration

The complex question of religious toleration bedevilled Irish politics in Hutcheson's era. In 1719, after much argument and dispute, a toleration bill was passed by the Irish parliament (without including Catholics in its compass), bringing measures for protestant dissenters in line with English legal arrangements. But the Act did not remove the Sacramental Test clause that excluded dissenters from political office. The work and career of Francis Hutcheson pivoted in a number of ways on issues of toleration. This paper investigates his relationship to an Irish tradition of thinking on the topic, associated with dissenters and with members of the established church, notably Edward Synge II, Archbishop of Tuam, and his son Edward Synge III (1691–1762), prebendary of St. Patrick's Cathedral in 1725 (and later Bishop of Elphin). The latter Synge was Hutcheson's friend and supporter.

Hutcheson himself had come to Dublin to lead a dissenting academy in the wake of the 1719 Act. The philosophy set out in *An Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue* (1725) can be considered as a plea for recognition of a common moral humanity which downplayed religious difference, making toleration a sound policy. The idiom of gratitude sounded throughout the work signals Presbyterian reasonableness. The position of Catholics in this scenario remained in doubt. For Edward Synge II, for example, the authority claimed by the pope and the prospect of disturbance from Catholics justified 'the restraint of strict laws'. Synge's son was slightly softer. He agreed that a religion posing a civil threat was not tolerable (a point underlined by the ongoing Jacobite danger), but he proposed to distinguish between Catholics who supported the unjust authority to depose princes claimed by the pope and those who repudiated it. Synge's strategy was evidently to expose those Catholics who remained politically problematic by agreeing an oath of abjuration that would expose the troublemakers and consolidate those worthy of inclusion in the state. Hutcheson's philosophy, viewed in this context, required careful expression on the issue of toleration. Overextending the case for toleration would have alienated the establishment support needed to advance the condition of dissenters. Only those in the confident position of Edward Synge III could risk a rapprochement, and even he received a stinging answer from the Vicar of Naas, Stephen Radcliffe, who replied with amazement that he could preach a sermon proposing Catholic toleration on the anniversary of the Irish Rebellion.

Hutcheson touched on the issue of toleration in his *Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions* (1728) and he subscribed in 1728 to a collection of eleven sermons by Gaspar Caillard, a Huguenot minister in Dublin, two of which addressed the theme of toleration. Hutcheson's emphasis in the *Essay* and in the *Inquiry* on what he termed 'calm publick Desires' and 'calm universal Benevolence', while resonating with his Stoic sensibilities, also suggested a distancing from any indications of enthusiasm, making his position reassuring in a Dublin context. Moreover, Hutcheson sounded a subtle anti-Catholic note, congenial in this setting, in the second edition of the *Inquiry* (1726), when paralleling American Indian atrocities with the St. Bartholomew's Day Massacre in Paris, the Irish rebellion, and the Inquisition, all 'flowing from a like Perversion of *Humanity* by *Superstition*'.

Gordon Graham
Princeton Theological Seminary

Democracy, Authority and God

In his defence of toleration, Locke famously excludes atheists and Catholics on the grounds that they reject the basis of the ultimate authority of the State. This exclusion fits rather ill with the political liberalism that eventually emerged from Locke's own Second Treatise on Government, and has thus been regarded as an unhappy limitation. Yet, an important question arises as to what the source of the State's ultimate authority is for liberal democracy. This talk explores this issue, and advances the case for thinking that Locke's exclusions are not so easily dismissed as contemporary political philosophy generally supposes.

Parallel sessions

Paolo Santori
University Roma LUMSA

Theodicy and Economics: Echoes of Bayle in Hume's and Smith's economic theories.

This research aims at comparing two modern traditions of economic thought, Classical Political and Civil Economy. The former, rooted in the Scottish Enlightenment, is represented by Adam Smith (1723-1790). The latter, developed within the Italian Enlightenment, flourished in Naples and had as its main exponent Antonio Genovesi (1713-1769). The comparison is based on the theological backgrounds of the works of Smith and Genovesi. More precisely, we interpret their economic views as two different answers to the problem of 'Theodicy', i.e. the coexistence between an almighty God and worldly evils. This paper also tries to re-open the Adam Smith Problem, stressing the discontinuity between *TheTheory of Moral Sentiments* (1759) and *The Wealth of Nations* (1776) from a theological, thus economic, perspective.

Michele Bee
University of Lausanne

Adam Smith's Fanaticism: The Economic Origins of Disagreeable Morals

Fanaticism in *The Wealth of Nations* is usually connected to competition among religious sects. Yet, Smith suggests also a relationship, often overlooked, between religious fanaticism and the economic conditions of life. The present article explores this connection throughout the link between variations in moral judgement on the expression of emotions and variations in general economic conditions, which is exposed in *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*. The aim of the article is to show how, according to Smith, economic depression and the rise of fanaticism in society can be related.

Justine Roulin
University of Lausanne

Family, sociability, and authority: the evolution of social relationships in John Millar's account of society

My aim is ot analyse John Millar's notion of sociability through the prism of the family. Millar's account of society combines two different schemes that encompass the evolution of society: the four stages theory (hunting, pasturage, agriculture and commerce), and a three stages model of political authority (the father, the chief, and the sovereign). The two schemes do not exactly overlap, the transition of political authority from chief to sovereign taking place in the course of the third, agricultural economic stage. Analysing Millar's interpretation of social progress from the angle of the family allows to identify his particular notion of sociability and to underline the evolution of each particular social relationship (between husband and wife, parent and child, master and servant).

Ross Carroll
University of Exeter

Laughter and Sociability in the Scottish Enlightenment

Philosophers in eighteenth-century Scotland took a keen interest in the psychology of laughter. In this paper I show how Francis Hutcheson, James Beattie, George Campbell, Hugh Blair, Adam Smith and Thomas Reid placed the recovery of an innocent form of laughter at the centre of their case for human sociability. In doing so, I argue, they made two key innovations in the study of laughter. First, they developed an historical explanation for why some societies and political regimes provided a richer environment for laugher than others. Second, by conceptually separating laughter from ridicule, they were able to restore ridicule as an instrument of sociability. Not only could ridicule function as a useful corrective to unsociable behaviours but it could also serve as an antidote to dangerous philosophical absurdities.

Tim Stuart-Buttle
University of York

Self-love and virtue: Archibald Campbell (1691-1756) and post-Hobbesian English natural law

Increased interest in the post-Hobbesian sociability debate has drawn attention to the once-neglected writings of Archibald Campbell. Campbell engaged more sympathetically than any of his contemporaries, prior to Hume, with Mandeville's identification of the origins of sociability in self-love and the desire for recognition. This led to an intellectually fertile exchange of views with Hutcheson. Campbell nonetheless offered a critique of Mandeville, who agreed with Hutcheson that virtuous actions must be disinterested. In claiming that benevolence is an enlargement of self-love, rather than its antithesis, Campbell professed to follow the lead of English natural lawyers whose theories he interpreted as critiques of Hobbes's theory of sociability: notably, Cumberland and Locke. My aim in this paper is two-fold: to explore these developments within English natural jurisprudence; and to explain how they enabled Campbell to advance the curious claim that Hutcheson's theory, by misinterpreting self-love, ultimately vindicated a vision of human nature (and God) that was indistinguishable from those of Hobbes, Mandeville and orthodox Presbyterianism.

Claire Etchegaray
University of Paris Nanterre (IREPH)

Hume's Cosmopolitanism

In a letter to Gilbert Elliot of Minto Hume says "I am a Citizen of the World" (22 Sept. 1764). We will compare the meaning of this statement with Diogenes' claim to be *kosmo-polites*. In the context of the letter Hume expresses the conviction that an author has the right to live

everywhere in the world he is loved and appreciated. Hence the following philosophical question may be arisen : does Hume's philosophy account for the fact that strangers can be loved and appreciated ? Answers to this question reveal deep biases in the Second book of the *Treatise*. The counterfactual correction of sympathy-bias overcomes some of them. It provides mutual understanding through exchanges and dialogues. Applied to understand foreign societies it helps to regard their values and appreciations as *acceptable* even though we do not adopt them. Rather than promoting a homogeneous cosmopolitan point of view, it can be used to produce a *human* point of view leaving open the option of a pluralistic cosmopolitism.

John McHugh
Denison University (Granville, OH, USA)

The General Point of View, the Impartial Spectator, and Moral Cosmopolitanism

Hume and Smith both supplemented their sympathy-based accounts of moral judgment in order to account for the objectivity and universality that moral judgments are typically taken to have. They argue that we make moral judgments not just via sympathy we immediately feel but via sympathy we would or do feel from a corrected perspective. But if, as both seem to think, we adopt these perspectives only to get along with our neighbors, the sympathy-based evaluations we make from them could end up being too parochial. With this kind of worry in mind, some scholars have argued that Hume's views tie moral development to interaction with people different from oneself and one's neighbors. The present paper will consider both whether it is defensible to read Smith this way and whether Smith's moral philosophy is more amenable to such a reading than Hume's.

Chris Shrock
Ohio Valley University

Restorationism is a Liberalism

Here, I elucidate Thomas Campbell's *Declaration and Address* through the lens of the Scottish common sense tradition. As I read Campbell, he offers an ecclesio-political liberalism, based on common sense principles also defended by Thomas Reid, most importantly, that individual beliefs are, strictly speaking, involuntary and therefore not subject to moral evaluation. This point, when coupled with a duty to disregard amoral factors in determining lines of ecclesial fellowship, suggests a correlative duty to accept self-proclaimed fellow Christians despite many likely differences of opinion. One can consider a brother or sister to be in error while also respecting that person's right to the assembly. Thus, I say that Campbell's is an exercise in liberalism, an attempt to protect fellow Christians' rights in the midst of diverse opinions.

Colin Heydt
University of South Florida

Hierarchy and the Scottish Enlightenment

This paper marks the very beginning of a study—philosophical, historical—of hierarchy. The project, as I envision it now, covers three main questions: 1) What is hierarchy? 2) What explains how hierarchies develop, get maintained, and decay? 3) In what cases is hierarchy justified? These questions about hierarchy are *descriptive*, *causal*, and *evaluative*.
Obviously, there are numerous subsidiary questions to tackle in order to give reasonable answers to these questions. Among these: How have hierarchy, subordination, and similar social and political phenomena been conceptualized in the past? The Scottish Enlightenment includes some of the earliest and most influential attempts to understand society and politics naturalistically. My hope is that a present-day theory of hierarchy benefits from understanding how Smith, Ferguson, and Millar thought of rank.
For the purposes of this paper, I am most interested in how the accounts of Smith, Ferguson, and Millar handle two questions: 1) How much is rank described as manifesting jurisprudentially (e.g. command, property) vs. socially (e.g. honor, deference, caste)? 2) What are the relative contributions of economic causes (e.g. forms of production), social causes (e.g. manners), and psychological causes (e.g. love of domination) in explaining the origin, maintenance, and decay of rank?

Ruth Boeker
University College Dublin

Thomas Reid on promises, Social Operations, and Liberty

Thomas Reid develops his account of promises in opposition Hume's view that fidelity to promises is an artificial virtue. According to Reid, Hume's mistake is that he fails to acknowledge that there are social operations in addition to solitary operations of mind. For Reid, promising is a social operation. For Reid social operations are irreducibly social. I offer a new interpretation of Reid's account of social operations that explains the naturalness and irreducibly social nature of social operations and show how my interpretation avoids problems that arise for Gideon Yaffe's interpretation. Next I consider a possible response that Hume could give in reaction to Reid's criticism and acknowledge that for Hume sociability is rooted in sympathy. I argue that Reid would not be satisfied by Hume's alternative view and propose that their disagreement is rooted in their different views concerning liberty.

Enrico Galvagni
University of Trento

Hume on Pride, Vanity, and Society

Pride is a fundamental element in Hume's description of human nature. However, no one seems to take seriously the fact that pride often appears in pairs with another passion, vanity. Despite Hume's fluctuating vocabulary, this paper states that a conceptual difference between pride and vanity exits. To uphold this claim, I analyse the common features of these two passions, showing that both pride and vanity: (a) are indirect passions; (b) are self-regarding

passions; (c) have the same structure. Supported by textual evidence, I then claim that *vanity* is a *desire of reputation*, a desire to feel pride, when pride is not (yet) in place because its cause is only imaginary and not real. In conclusion, I explore the implications of this account of vanity for society and sociability in Hume's philosophy, coming to illustrate its intrinsic ambiguity.

Jacopo Agnesina
Università del Piemonte Orientale "Amedeo Avogadro"

"Whatever is different is contrary": Hume, religion and sociability.

David Hume, in the essay entitled *Of Miracles* (1748), challenges the the truth of miracles. As a reason to reject them, Hume propose something that will led us to the issue of religious intolerance: «[…] let us consider, that, in matters of religion, *whatever is different is contrary.* [...] Every miracle, […] as its direct scope is to establish the particular system to which is attributed; […] so has it the same force, though more indirectly, to *overthrow every other system*» [*Italic* is mine].
Hume argue in favour of a general autonomy of moral and politics from religion. On the contrary, Hume alleges that the societies that religions build up are naturally driven to overwhelm other societies established by different religions.
In this Talk, I'll investigate the attitude that Hume had to read the religion as a negative factor for the well-being of society.

Willem Lemmens
University of Antwerp

Monotheistic Enthusiasm or Polytheistic Superstition? Hume on Tolerance and Religious Moderation

In the *Natural History of Religion*, Hume famously contends that the spirit of polytheism, with its focus on religious symbolism and idolatry, is in general more tolerant and morally lenient than monotheism, where a sense of enthusiastic elevation generally fosters intolerance and religious zeal. In this paper I will explore and nuance this contention, drawing from the essay 'Of Superstition and Enthusiasm' and some of Hume's observations on the political function of religion in his *History of England* and *Idea of a perfect Commonwealth*. I defend that for Hume religious tolerance can only flourish in a context where wise politicians allow superstitious practices and institutions to be established in order to alleviate the potential violence and fury of religious enthusiasm. Apparently, Hume thus acknowledges that some features of ancient polytheistic tolerance can still be preserved within a tolerant modern Christian monotheism. How this view mirrors Hume's thesis, also defended in the *Natural History of Religion*, about the flux and reflux between polytheism and monotheism to be found in every historical religion, I will try to elucidate.

Jeffrey Edwards

Stony Brook University (State University of New York)

Hutcheson on Natural Sociability and States of Nature

In his inaugural lecture of November 1730, Francis Hutcheson holds that the term *status naturalis* is standardly so ambiguously employed that it allows for the depiction of the human being as, fundamentally, "a mute and naked animal, poor, solitary, nasty, dirty, rude, ignorant, timid, rapacious, aggressive, unsociable, incapable of giving or attracting love." (*De naturali hominum socialitate oratio inauguralis* [2006 translation], p. 198). While Thomas Hobbes's descriptions of humankind's natural condition represent the primary targets of this rhetorical broadside, the line of criticism that it reflects extends to Samuel von Pufendorf as well—which is why, according to Hutcheson, "not only Hobbes but Pufendorf himself have paid the penalty at the hands of such distinguished men as Titius, Barbeyrac, Cumberland, Carmichael, and above all the Earl of Shaftesbury" (pp. 198-199). The first main phase of my remarks focuses on three of the penalty-imposing figures just indicated: Gottlieb Gerhard Titius, Jean Barbeyrac, and Gershom Carmichael. The second phase evaluates Hutcheson's assessment of Hobbes in view of these three thinkers' assessments of Pufendorf.

Sophie Bergont
Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne

Hutcheson and Hume on the Spheres of Sociability

When he deals with sociability, solidarity and morality, Hume claims that sympathy, duly extended by reflection, allows us to approve of good actions and characters even though they belong to distant times or spaces. Here Hume comes close to one of Hutcheson's theses, and offers a naturalistic explanation to an observation that was at the core of his predecessor's moral philosophy. This talk aims to shed light on a crucial difference between the two authors, that lies under this common assertion. Indeed, Hutcheson claims that the highest degree of moral virtue is universal benevolence, namely an affection towards the good of any human being. I will argue that Hume's *Treatise* offers a straightforward criticism of this view of moral perfection. While Hutcheson promotes the love of mankind as the criterion of the highest moral attitude, Hume defines moral perfection within some narrower spheres of sociability.

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3. Information

Conference building: Extranef

Ground floor



Extranef Floor 1

Campus map


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Unithèque
Extension de l'Unithèque

Campus and Lausanne

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