The Power of Swiss Patrician Families: between Decline and Persistence (1890–1957)

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Abstract

Scholars have demonstrated the important role of inheritance and dynastic patterns for the perpetuation and deepening of inequality. Switzerland is a country without royal dynasties. Historians have shown that patrician families – those that occupied positions of power in important Swiss cities before the French revolution – continued to play an important role in Swiss cities until the beginning of the 20th century. However, little is known about the evolution of this 'patrician power structure' over the course of the 20th century. Social network analysis is of crucial help to analyze the changing place of the patrician family members in the different spheres of power and the reproduction of local patrician elites through up to six generations. To cope with the challenges of historical data sources, we combine historical with sociological approaches. Building on a systematic database of local elites who hold positions of power in the main economic, political, academic, and cultural institutions of the three major Swiss city-regions (Basel, Geneva, and Zurich), we analyze the evolution of kinship networks of the Swiss urban power elite between 1890 and 1957. We focus on both power positions and kinship ties by combining social network analysis, kinship analysis, and prosopography on historical/biographical data on about 5,200 local elites. Our analyses proceed in three steps. We first analyze the long-term presence of representatives of old patrician families at the head of different local organizations and institutions in different social spheres and in different city-regions. In a second step, we study the cohesion of these patrician families through an analysis of kinship ties to the 4th degree of consanguinity and affinity. For instance, we look at the percentage of old patrician family members of the same local elite cohort that are linked through a marriage or lineage link. In a final step, we present some illustrative examples of patrician families, and how their descendants have maintained or abandoned their elite positions during the 20th century.

Keywords: Switzerland, local elites, patrician families, kinship, closure, power

1 Introduction

Until the end of the 19th century, European cities were dominated by local "urban oligarchies". With the rise of the nation-state and growing urbanization, these local oligarchies have since progressively lost their dominance (Le Galès and Therborn 2010). This general observation applies particularly well to the Swiss case. In the absence of a monarchic tradition and aristocracy at the national level, social power was largely concentrated in the hands of old patrician families at the city/communal level. Historians have shown that patrician families – those that occupied positions of power in important Swiss cities before the French revolution – continued to play a central role in Swiss cities until the beginning of the 20th century by holding dominant positions in the economic, political, academic, and cultural spheres of urban life (Tanner 1990, 1995; Sarasin 1998; Perroux 2006). However, little is known about the evolution of this 'patrician power structure' (Sarasin 1998) over the course of the 20th century.

Many questions may be raised. For instance, did patricians succeed to perpetuate their domination during the 20th century? Until when? Can we observe differences across social spheres? How densely were patrician families connected? How did the kinship ties between these patrician families evolve during the 20th century? Did patrician family networks dissolve or persist over time? To answer these research questions, we combine a historical and a sociological approach to the analysis of family networks to highlight the power concentration in the hands of the traditional patrician families and its evolution. Building on a systematic database of n=5,200 local elites in the three major Swiss city-regions (Basel, Geneva, and Zurich) from 1890 until 1957, we analyze the evolution of kinship networks of the Swiss urban power elite over seventy years. This allows us to develop multiple comparisons: between the three city-regions, over time, and across four social spheres: academic, economic, political, and cultural.

The article is structured as follows: we *first* address the most salient issues from the historical and sociological literature regarding kinship ties and power positions. *Second*, we develop the specificities of our study case, i.e., the Swiss urban elite between 1890 and 1957. We draw on the previous scholarship on patrician families in Basel, Geneva, and Zurich, describe our data, and the operationalization of patrician families' kinship ties. Our empirical study of the evolution of patrician families' power in a *third* part is divided into three: 1) the patrician families' retreat from powerful positions, 2) the evolution of patrician families' kinship ties with other members of the elite, and 3) a final in-depth study of two cases of urban dynasties. *Finally,* we deliver a nuanced conclusion towards the declining power of Swiss patrician families. While, on the one hand, patricians clearly retreat from power positions, we notice that this retreat does not seem, on the other, to result in a loss of kinship ties with other members of the elite. In-depth examples attest of the possible strategies to maintain influence, through marriages and the occupation of powerful positions by descendants of affiliated families.

2 Kinship Ties and Power Positions

In the past few decades, historians of modern Europe have closely examined the ability of the *ancien régime* elite to withstand political turbulence (revolutions, wars) or long-term structural changes (industrialization). The extent to which elite families may retain powerful positions over the long term has been explored in various contexts. Mayer (1981) showed that, across Europe, the *ancien régime* elite still occupied the leading positions both in political and economic realms up until 1914,

and that this prominence was never seriously challenged by the rising bourgeoisie. German historiography has shown that the power of Junker families remained unchallenged well into the 20th century, despite the massive industrialization which the country underwent (Carsten 1990). The case of France, which, of all major Western European countries arguably witnessed the most radical form of political instability from 1789 onwards, – and serves for this reason as a good case study of elite resilience – has been particularly scrutinized. Looking at electoral list data, Beck (1981) showed that the occupational structures and wealth level of the French nobility exhibited little change between 1789 and 1839. Likewise, both Higgs (1987) and Charle (1988) have documented the significant presence of noble families in economic, cultural, and political elite positions in the 19th century. Focusing on the case of post-unification Italy, Brilli, and Conca Messina (2021) showed that the Lombard nobility played a leading economic role and participated non-negligibly in the country's industrial modernization, despite the formal loss of political power which they endured in the early 19th century.

The 20th century has received less attention than the 19th century on that specific issue. It has, however, not been completely neglected. The case of Britain has in that regard given rise to ambiguous results. Cannadine (1990) claimed that British aristocratic families witnessed a steady and relentless decline from the 1880s to the 1930s, in terms of both wealth and power. Mandler (2004) nuanced Cannadine's findings by showing that they were mostly driven by chronological choices: when one extends the chronological boundary beyond the mid-20th century, the aristocratic decline – measured in wealth – appears much less pronounced. The Dutch case has recently received historiographical attention. Using data from the Dutch Nobility Association, Unger and Dronkers (2012) have argued that the Dutch nobles did succeed, up until today, in preserving their social prominence – a result which, the authors argue, challenges "modernization theory" (according to which access to the ranks of the elite is to be determined by competence only).

To account for the continued occupation of positions of power by powerful families, historians and social scientists have increasingly resorted to the notion of *kinship*. This notion – referring to the set of bonds between individuals within a society, established through blood (consanguinity) or marriage – has been mobilized to make sense of some of the deep features of Western political structures. Haldén (2020) has argued that kinship, with its concrete manifestation in the form of power dynasties, has constituted the bedrock of Western political order since the fall of the Roman Empire, and that the capacity of elite families to build strong and extensive kinship networks directly explains the successful State building which Europe witnessed in the early modern period. In a similar fashion, the role of family strategies in securing privilege and political positions has been studied by Adams (2005), in the context of the Dutch Golden Age, whose political organization was characterized by what she called a "Familial State". Italian city States have also often constituted popular cases to study the embeddedness of elite families' interests within the fabric of the local political apparatuses (Padgett 1993). The entanglement of kinship and political power was of course not confined to early modern Europe. In a study of early 19th century America, Aronson (1964), showed that a significant share (about a third) of the recruitment into higher civil service could be attributed to kinship ties to people who had held high offices. More recently, Del Valle and Larrosa (2019), using network analysis, have shown that individuals belonging to families with many ties tended to have a higher likelihood to sit in Buenos Aires' town's council, for the period 1776-1810.

Following the renewed interest in studying the dynamics of inequalities (Piketti 2014; Savage 2021), the research on elites and their networks has gained momentum (Korsnes et al. 2018; Larsen and Ellersgaard 2018; Rossier et al. 2022). Family ties, and especially marriage, have been little studied, even though they are a core strategy of elite's social closure (Bourdieu 1976; Mills 2000[1956]; Toft and Jarness 2021). In the case of Norway, Toft and Hansen (2021) focus on the links

between homogamy and social closure through alliances and wealth accumulation strategies over the life-course. Unlike very recent sociological studies on elites, the role of marriage has received a particular attention by historians. The tendency of members of elite families to marry members of other elite families – homogamy – has been widely established (Santiago-Caballero 2021). The capacity to ensure a certain degree of homogamy among offsprings represents a crucial driver of dynastic preservation. It serves as an instrument to build alliances and to avoid the dilution of power or wealth (Augustine 1994). Drawing on a wide genealogical database containing information on some 128,000 Polish noblemen, Minakowski and Smoczynski (2019) quantitatively studied the prevalence of homogamous marriages within the descendants of the "Great Sjem" (the MPs during the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth) and found that the rate of homogamy was constant until the mid-20th century. Studying the case of contemporary Norway, Toft and Jarness (2021) showed that members of the upper class were not only more likely to marry within the upper class, but that they were also more likely to marry within the same segments of the upper class (economic elites more likely to marry other members of the economic elite, etc). Other studies – such as Nakaoka's (2022) comparative analysis of Japan and Germany – have, however, found that inter-sphere elite marriages were in fact quite common. Some of these marriages could be interpreted as trades: a family would bring in the prestige associated with a centuries-old aristocratic name, while the other would bring in economic capital. A dimension of *endogamy* (marriage within the same ethnic group) came sometimes on top of the homogamy, especially among minority ethnic groups, a phenomenon which Armani (2004) documented in the case of the Jewish economic elite in Italy between the mid-19th century to the early 20th century. In narrow social milieus, where the scope of elite groups was quantitatively restricted, it was not rare for marriages to occur within the family itself, typically between cousins (Johnson 2015).

The savvy establishment and nurturing of strategic kinship alliances also represents a factor in the long-term success of family businesses. The latter still represent, despite the growing managerialization of the past 100 years, an important modality of capitalist production in Western countries (Colli 2003; Ginalski 2015). The trust which kinship ties endow family firms with, represents a crucial competitive advantage in times of economic or political turbulence (Berghoff 2006). "The family", as Harold James put it in his study of three important European business dynasties – the Wendels, Haniels, Falcks – "as an intermediary organization, is particularly effective when both States and market are chaotic" (James 2006: 12). The extent of the family network played a central role in the growth and prosperity of the great investment banking dynasties such as the Rothschilds (Landes 2006) or the Schroders (Roberts 1992), in a business domain where trust is key. Kinship also played a role at the industry-level. In her study of the 19th century Boston elite families – the so-called Boston Brahmins – Farrell (1993) showed how, through interlocking family interests and intermarriage, a few textile manufacturers exerted control over some of the city's central economic institutions, including banks, which facilitated access to capital.

Of course, despite the proven resilience of some families at the top, there is no mechanical guarantee of status preservation. New elite families emerge, while others decline. The putative tendency of business dynasties to decline after a few generations is known as the "Buddenbrooks effect" (in reference to Thomas Mann's eponymous novel): children raised in privileged circumstances may develop a propensity to idleness and profligacy, detrimental to the family's prosperity. Becker and Tomes (1994) argued that both family income and assets exhibited rapid regression to the mean. In his study of *The Rise and Decline of Virginia's Old Political Elite* in the 18th century, Evans (2009) documents the changing tastes and spending habits over time of the members of the local elite families. The younger generations developed a taste for luxury and accumulated increasing amounts of debts, to an excess of which they ended up succumbing. Eventually, the degree to which the factors conducive to status preservation end up overriding the dispersion factors depends on a whole array of

circumstances, with local, national as well as international ramifications. The context in which the Swiss elite families navigated, during the period under study in this article, is the object of the following section.

3 Swiss Urban Elites between 1890 and 1957

This section focusing on our case study is divided into three: *first*, we develop the specificities of the patrician families in the city-regions of Basel, Geneva, and Zurich. *Second*, we present our data and, *third*, we operationalize our measure of patrician families' kinship ties with other members of the elite.

3.1 Patrician families in Swiss cities

Before seeking to understand the way in which the network of patrician families in Switzerland unfolds, it is worthwhile to discuss the very notion of patriciate and the specificity of the Swiss case. The bourgeoisie in the 19th century was particularly strong and influential in Switzerland. Its power was widely extended to the economy, politics, and culture. This situation was made possible because of the absence of a Swiss aristocracy, which left the way open for the establishment of a dominant bourgeois structure (Tanner 1995: 1-4). However, the Swiss bourgeoisie was not homogenous, for it was composed of different strata and its contours were historically always fluctuating (Sarasin 1998). At the top of this social group was the patriciate, which was the wealthiest layer of the bourgeoisie and whose manners were very close to those of the European aristocracy (Sarasin 1998: 7-12).

The origin of the patriciate's material affluence essentially predates the industrial revolutions (Mach et al. 2016: 41), since the first patrician families already appeared in the Middle Ages and the hereditary nature of their privileged status was consolidated around 1500. At that time, the system set up by the patriciate however varied from canton to canton. The cities of Bern, Fribourg, Solothurn, and Lucerne thus presented a system that was closed to newcomers and relied essentially on their monopoly of public offices to assert their power. The situation was, however, different in the cities of Basel, Zurich, Geneva, Schaffhausen and St. Gallen, where the patriciate remained somewhat more open to newcomers and whose activities were mainly concentrated in commerce and industry (Schläppi 2010). The socio-political events which took place in the early 19th century and led to the creation of modern Switzerland however seriously challenged the hegemony of the patrician families, thus forcing them to adapt to the emergence of new economic elites, who acquired great wealth during the industrial revolutions (Mach et al. 2016: 39). The dividing line between these old families in the cities and the rest of the bourgeoisie consequently became increasingly blurred over the course of the century (König 2011: 104-107). There were, however, some regional differences regarding the levels of porosity between those social groups, which we now discuss in more detail for the cities of Basel, Zurich and Geneva.

Of all three cities, the patriciate of Basel was probably the one which presented the most enclosed system. According to Sarasin (1998), this situation can be explained by various factors. The first one is political, for the division of the canton in 1833 between city and countryside isolated the patriciate from the competition of the emerging rural bourgeoisie. The second factor is the involvement of the patrician families in the flourishing silk trade, which lasted until the 1870s. By trading silk internationally with the colonies from the 18th century onwards, patrician families indeed became very wealthy, and their great fortune allowed them to transform from merchant-manufacturers into genuine bankers, who played a key role in financing the mechanization of industry in Switzerland (Schär 2015). The long decline of this extremely lucrative trade from the 1870s to the First World War however

caused a shift in the hegemony of patrician families, for they had to deal with the emerging new elites, made up of owners and company directors of the new chemical industry. The patriciate nevertheless managed to maintain its power thanks to the third factor identified by Sarasin (1998), which is the strong endogamy cultivated by the patrician families. Marriage was a keyway for these urban elites to consolidate and extend their social and professional ties. It was indeed through the marriage of their daughters that the patrician silk industry and chemical industry in Basel came together.

The situation was somewhat different in Zurich, where – as in other Swiss cantons – the patrician elites were marked by the adoption of the new constitution of 1830, and thus forced to give up some of their political privileges to the bourgeois middle class since then. The city of Zurich thus demonstrated a less strict separation between patrician and emerging bourgeois affairs, since these two social groups collaborated professionally, as they shared common interests in the regulation of the market and its structure. From the second half of the 19th century onwards, Tanner (1990, 1995) moreover demonstrated that the matrimonial practices in Zurich were characterized by a greater openness than other Swiss cantons, for they were used to consolidate the social and professional ties between the old patriciate and the new economic elites.

In contrast to Zurich and other Swiss cantons, the patrician families of Geneva managed to escape the turmoil of the 1830s thanks to a constitution they had put in place after the departure of the French in 1814. According to Perroux (2006), the patriciate was nonetheless not as clearly defined and enclosed as in Basel. The patrician families indeed never completely separated themselves from the bourgeoisie, despite occasional major disagreements, notably marked by the "radical revolution" of 1846 that contested the power of the traditional patrician families. Drawing on the concept developed by Lüthy (1959), Perroux describes their network as a "spider's web", with multiple family and professional links between the bourgeoisie and the patriciate, often reinforced by marriages. After the radical revolution of 1846, the patriciate, however, lost some of its political power. Patrician families nevertheless managed to keep their influence by maintaining important positions in the economic, social, and cultural spheres throughout the 19th century (Perroux 2006; David & Heiniger 2019: 15).

3.2 Positional Data on Swiss Urban Elites, 1890-1957

To document the domination of old patrician families and its evolution in the three largest Swiss cities, we have constructed a systematic database of local elites, on the basis of positional criteria, i.e., who occupied power positions in the major economic, political, academic, and cultural institutions from 1890 until 1957 for four benchmark years (1890, 1910, 1937 and 1957). For all these important local institutions, we gathered information on the leading individuals. For the economic sphere, we considered the members of the committee of the regional chambers of commerce, organizing local business elites, as well as the most important companies of the leading economic sectors of the three regions. This involved all the major banks (large universal banks, private banks, and public owned banks) and insurance companies for the financial sector; for Basel, all the major textile (until 1937) and chemical-pharmaceutical companies; for Geneva, the major watch-making companies, as well as a few other industrial companies; and for Zurich, all the major companies from the machine industry. The total number of companies varies from 49 in 1890 to 45 in 1957. For all these companies, we included the CEO/General director and all the members of the boards of directors in the database.

For the political sphere, we included all the members of the cantonal (regional) and local (communal) parliaments and governments for Geneva and Zurich, whereas in Basel, where the city's territory fully coincides with the canton, only the members of the cantonal parliament and government

were considered.[1] For the academic sphere, all full and extraordinary (associate) professors have been included in the database. Finally, we also included all the members of the committee of the art societies of the three cities, as displayed in table 1 (for more details on the composition of the sample, see **Appendix 1**)[2].

Table 1. Sample size by city-region and benchmark year

	1890	1910	1937	1957
Basel	297 (373)	376 (434)	400 (467)	408 (473)
Geneva	283 (367)	323 (386)	370 (416)	441 (506)
Zurich	534 (642)	578 (702)	578 (689)	612 (726)
Total	1114 (1382)	1277 (1522)	1348 (1572)	1461 (1705)

**Note.* N individuals and N mandates (in parentheses). The total for the individuals can be smaller than the sum of the different lines since the same individuals can occupy positions in different city-regions in the same benchmark year.

3.3 Operationalizing Patrician Families and Kinship Ties

This section presents the operationalization of our key indicators, namely being a member of a patrician family and having kinship ties with other elites. In a first step, we explain how patrician families were identified. In a second step, we focus on the operationalization of kinship ties, from the overall network of family ties to a given subset of genealogical trees.

To determine who is a descendant of a patrician family, we rely on an indicator that captures the moment at which a person's family obtained the right of citizenship in the cities of Basel, Geneva, Zurich, and Winterthur – the last being the second largest city in the canton of Zurich, with important long-lived dynasties. In Switzerland, each Swiss citizen has a legal place of origin. Historically, the place of origin – a municipality or a city – was the decisive criterion for whether a person has political and social rights in that particular place or not. Before the year 1800, i.e., the time before the *ancien régime* was replaced by the Helvetic Republic (a predecessor of the modern Swiss State under Napoleonic rule), the place of origin determined where a person had political rights. Until recently, social rights – e.g., the right to obtain social assistance – were tied to one's place of origin.[3] And until today, a Swiss citizen's place of origin is indicated in his/her passport.

We use the information on the place of origin of elite members as a starting point to determine since when they had the right of citizenship in a particular place. To do so, we rely on the Swiss family name book.[4] This source indicates the last names of all persons that held citizenship rights in a Swiss city or municipality up to 1962 as well as when and where the first person with that last name was

[1] In Basel, the cantonal parliament and the cantonal government also serve as the city's government and parliament.

[2] The whole database also includes three more recent benchmark years (1980, 2000 and 2020). However, for the purpose of this contribution, they were not taken into account for the following reason: The belonging to patrician families has lost its importance during the second half of the 20th century and the identification of family ties for the contemporary descendants of patrician families cannot be as systematic as for the previous benchmark years. Even though you still find numerous descendants of patrician families during the more recent period, especially in the economic sphere, it is more difficult to document their family ties. For more information on the database, see https://wp.unil.ch/sinergia-elites/

[3] For instance, during the time of the infamous open drug scene in Zurich in the 1990s, the city of Zurich sent addicts that needed social assistance and care to their place of origin municipalities, since the latter were formally obliged to take care of them and not the city of Zurich. Only in 2012, the obligation of the place of origin to take over the costs of social assistance was formally removed.

[4] https://hls-dhs-dss.ch/famn/.

granted this right. For each family name and place of origin combination of elite members, we thus checked when that particular family obtained citizenship rights in that particular place. We consider those who obtained the right of citizenship before the year 1800 in one of the four cities indicated above as members of patrician families. The year 1800 serves as the cut-off point, because – as mentioned – it was the time when the *ancien régime* – and hence the system where political rights at the local level were tied to the place of origin – was abolished and replaced by the Helvetic republic. Those that held citizenship rights before 1800 had strong prerogatives in Swiss cities, for instance, only they were allowed to take political office. While Switzerland since long was not subject to monarchic or aristocratic rule, a patrician elite – consisting only of families with citizenship rights – emerged in many Swiss cities and dominated them until the end of the *ancien régime* (Schläppi 2010). Therefore, the time of citizenship obtention in one of the four cities is a good – even if approximative – indicator for whether elites are descendants of patrician families or not.

Table 2. Members of patrician families per cohort

	1890	1910	1937	1957
Partician (n)	309	253	187	135
Patrician (%)	27.7%	19.8%	13.9%	9.2%
Total members of the elite	1114	1277	1348	1461

To capture family ties of the members of patrician families, we gathered systematic information on their kinship ties for parents, grandparents, spouse, and grandparents-in-law. Sons and daughters were also identified when provided, even if not on a systematic basis. Most information was collected through four main sources: the *Historisches Familienlexikon der Schweiz (hfls.ch)*, the website of the genealogical society of Geneva *gen-gen.ch*, *stroux.org* and the *Bürgerbuch der Stadt Zürich (1882-1926)*. From the extensive information collected, we have built a network of all family ties as a stack of individual relationships through either parenthood or marriage. From this entire network, it was then possible to isolate specific subgroups, i.e., by city-region or sphere, without losing the family links that characterize them.

The next step of the operation consists in transforming network-based data into genealogical trees, the latter being essential for kinship analysis. From the network of family ties, we can extract any given set of nodes and all related edges using the *igraph* and related packages for R software. In addition, all links between this set of nodes, as well as with any other linked node, are displayed. The resulting network is likely to be too extensive to be interpreted. Indeed, family ties can easily extend to very distant degrees, without the individuals knowing or having met each other. The literature thus tends to favor a reasonable kinship distance to the 3rd canonical degree of consanguinity, a threshold beyond which individuals generally do not know their family members (Ruggiu 2010; Barry and Gasperoni 2008). The literature qualifies this threshold to the 4th canonical degree of consanguinity for the case of elites, who may have greater knowledge of their family ties and may have more dynastic awareness (Mathieu 2007; Rappo 2021).

For our analyses, we consider kinship of patrician families either to the first cousins or to second cousins. Table 3 displays relationships which correspond to each degree of consanguinity (ascendance and descendance) and affinity (marriages).

Table 3. Consanguinity and affinity distances (from ego)



4 The Evolution of Patrician Families' Power

To analyze the evolution of the power of patrician families in the three city-regions, we proceed in three steps. *First*, we look at the presence of descendants of patrician families in power positions in different social spheres in the three cities. *Second*, we analyze the average number of kinship ties patrician family members have with other patricians or other members of the local elite, and compare different benchmark years, city-region, and spheres of influence. *Finally*, we focus on two case studies to illustrate in more details the major findings of the two first sections.

4.1 Patrician Families' Retreat from Powerful Positions

We start our analysis with an overview of the positions that descendants of patrician families held in the academic, cultural, economic, and political sphere in the three city-regions. Figures 1-4 show the percentage of positions that were occupied by patrician family members in the different spheres and city-regions between 1890 and 1957. When an elite member holds multiple mandates simultaneously in multiple spheres, we counted it in each sphere. Across all spheres and city-regions, we see a clear decline in the percentage of positions occupied by patrician family members over time. This suggests that the power patrician families exercised in these cities over all declined from the end of the 19th until the middle of the 20th century (see Figures 1 to 4 below for a general overview, by city-regions and by social spheres).[5]

[5] It is important to note that for a substantial number of positions, we do not have the information on their occupants place of origin and hence couldn't determine for sure whether their family had citizenship rights in one of the cities

Figure 1. Basel: patrician family members' occupation of powerful positions



Figure 2. Geneva: patrician family members' occupation of powerful positions



before 1800 ("NA" in figures 1-4). However, we can be rather confident that most elite positions in this category were not occupied by patrician family members. Patrician family names are few and they are rather well-known. Moreover, these families are rather well-documented in genealogical sources and finding information on them is thus less complicated than for individuals with family names that are very common and/or have a more modest social origin. We, thus, run little risk to underestimate the percentage of positions occupied by descendants of patrician families.

Figure 3. Zurich: patrician family members' occupation of powerful positions



Figure 4. Three cities combined: patrician family members' occupation of powerful positions



Yet, a closer look also shows some stark differences – both across spheres and between city-regions. Between city-regions, we can see that the percentage of positions occupied by patrician family members is much higher overall in the city-regions of Basel and Geneva compared to Zurich. According to Sarasin (1998), one explanation for this might be that these families faced less outside competition from newcomers in Basel and Geneva than in Zurich, because both Basel and Geneva have been independent city-states for a long time, whereas the city of Zurich was the head of a territorial state with a sizeable *hinterland*. Patrician families in Zurich, thus, faced competition and demands from the rural population that wanted a piece of the cake early in the 19th century. By contrast,

in Basel and Geneva, it was only when the workers' movement grew stronger at the beginning of the 20th century, that these families lost their grip over the cities to some extent.

Between spheres, we also see clear differences that resemble one another across city-regions. At the end of the 19th century, the art societies of the three cities were clearly dominated by patrician family members in all three cities. While this progressively changed in the coming decades, patrician families still remained very important until the end of the 1930s in the cultural sphere – at least in Basel and Geneva. Even though the sample size for the committee of the three art societies is relatively small, the clear overrepresentation of the patrician families, especially for the first benchmark years, confirms the strong investment of these old families in cultural institutions. Hiler (1995), for the reading society of Geneva, and Kriemler (2017), for the one of Basel, have shown the strong involvement of representatives of the patrician families in these two local institutions during the 19th century.

The second most important sphere dominated by patrician families is the economic one – again particularly in Basel and Geneva. Here, major companies – particularly private banks, but also companies from the textile, the chemical, and the watch-making industry – were, or still are, led or in possession of patrician families. Both in Basel and Geneva, more than 50% of all positions in company boards and chambers of commerce were held by patrician family members in 1890 and they continued to play an important role in the decades to come. In Zurich, patrician families were not dominant anymore in the economic sphere in 1890 – based on the percentage of positions occupied – but the economic sphere was still their second most important sphere of influence in the period under study. This strong presence of descendants of patrician families in the leading positions of the most important companies is also illustrative of the strength and longevity of family capitalism in Switzerland (Ginalski, 2015).

Patrician family members were also particularly active in the scientific/academic sphere, where some true scientific dynasties existed. The data in Figures 1 to 4 tend even to underestimate the presence of patrician professors in the three cantonal universities. As underlined by Horvath (1996), major Swiss universities, especially Basel and Geneva, were dominated by two categories of professors until the first World war: 1) offspring from local patrician families and 2) foreign professors. If we do not take into account foreign professors in data presented in Figure 1 to 4, descendants of patrician families represented more than half of the Swiss professors in Basel and Geneva for the years 1890 and 1910; again, this was less the case in Zurich (see also Montandon 1975, on the strong presence of patrician representatives in the scientific community in Geneva during the 19th century). Yet, patrician domination prevailed somewhat less long than in the economic and the cultural sphere. On the one hand, the presence of foreign professors has clearly declined after the First World War (Rossier et al., 2015), and on the other hand, the proportion of descendants of patrician families decreased among Swiss professors during the same period.

Finally, the sphere where patrician family members were in a minority in all three city-regions since the end of the 19th century is the political one. Since holding political positions is subject to being elected by voters and since patrician families only made up a small portion of a city's population, they faced competition in this domain from the moment at which general elections were held – i.e. from at least 1848 onwards – in all cities. This was notably the case in Basel, as analyzed by Lüthi (1963), who documents the progressive declining presence of patrician families in the cantonal parliament from 1870 until 1914. In all three cities, challenger movements formed first within the bourgeoisie of the cities – composed of citizens that had substantial resources but were not part of the traditional patrician elite – and later by the labor movement. Indeed, in the 1930s, all three city-regions experienced periods where the workers' movement and socialist parties were in a majority position and dominated government and parliament.

Overall, we can observe a general decline in the power of patrician families in all three city-regions and in different spheres, however with significant differences in the extent of domination at the outset, i.e. in 1890, as well as the extent of the decline across city-regions and spheres of power. The similar patterns for the social spheres across the three city-regions can largely be explained by the different logics of selection to access power positions in these different spheres. Whereas the economic and cultural spheres follow a logic of cooptation, that tends to reinforce the reproduction of dominant groups, the political sphere is subject to a more formally democratic procedure of designation, favoring a composition of elected officials more representative of the population as a whole; finally, the logic of recruitment in the academic sphere refers to more meritocratic and scientific criteria for achieving a career in this field.

4.2 Patrician Families' Kinship Ties

In this second part, we focus on the evolution of patrician families' kinship ties. We proceed in two steps. *First*, we provide some descriptive insights of the network of all relationships between members of patrician families and the Swiss elite between 1890 and 1957. *Then*, we focus on the evolution of the average number of ties that each patrician has with other elite members of the same city-region in the same benchmark year. This strategy will allow us to evaluate the persistence of family ties beyond the decrease of patrician family members in the main positions of power. It will also allow us to measure the degree of social closure of these families through the relations they maintain with other members of the elite.

All generations, cohorts, and all cities combined, the total network of family ties includes 10,474 nodes and 11,535 edges. The network is made of 642 components, with one very big component and multiple very low-sized components with a minimum of three individuals (table 4).

Table 4. Size of the ten first components

Component	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
N	6342	51	48	48	47	40	36	36	32	31

The presence of many very small components next to the main component indicates that the elites are globally very connected through their family ties. It also indicates that the restoration of a missing link does not significantly alter the overall structure of ties. However, we are confident in the robustness of our analysis, given that these missing links are not likely to significantly change the analysis at four and six degrees of kinship. Figure 5 displays the principal component of the network, which contains 6342 nodes (60.55%) and 7,880 edges (68.31%).

Figure 5. Network of family ties: biggest component (60.55% of nodes, 68.3% of edges)



Legend: colors of nodes refer to the city-regions: Geneva on the left (darkblue), Basel in the center (lightblue), and Zurich on the right (black).

The size of the nodes corresponds to the degree, that is the number of relations of *1st* degree: in our case children, parent, and spouse. The network of family ties does look like a "spider's web" of multiple ties (Perroux 2006; Lüthy 1959), especially for Geneva and Basel patricians who form quite distinct hubs. The patrician families of Zurich appear to be less connected to each other or connected at greater distances, which echoes the greater openness of matrimonial practices with the non-patrician elite (Tanner 1990, 1995).

The three most influent patrician families in terms of the number of members who hold power positions are situated in Basel: the Bruckhardt, Vischer and Sarasin families respectively count for 57, 35 and 31 nodes in the network. The Staehelin and Merian families follow with 20 and 19 nodes. In Geneva, the five most important patrician families are the Pictet, (25 nodes), Gautier (13), Hentsch (13), Oltramare (13) and Naville (12). In Zurich, the Sulzer (25), Escher (17), Frey (16), Huber (12) and Schulthess (12). On a total of 320 positions of power held by these patrician families, 196 positions (61%) are related to the economic sphere, 69 positions (21.6%) to the academic sphere, 38 positions

(11.9%) to the economic sphere and 17 positions (5.3%) to the cultural sphere. All information on the most important patrician families is displayed in **Appendix 2**.

From the network of kinship ties, we extracted sub-samples to measure the average number of ties patrician elites have with other positional elites at the same benchmark year. Figure 6 displays the average number of family ties at the 4th degree, i.e., including parents and children, nephews/nieces, uncles/aunts, and first cousins. The figure also includes marriage and all other relationships at the 4th degree of alliance.

Figure 6. Patrician family members' links with positional elites of same cohort



From figure 6 we note that the average number of ties patrician family members have with other elites remains very stable over time. Rather, the overall trend is that of a stability of the average number of ties – even if with sensible variation across city-regions and spheres. In Basel, the average number of links remains relatively stable for patricians in the academic and economic spheres, even if it decreases slightly for the latter. In contrast, the political and cultural elites develop more and more links with the other elites, going from an average of 2.5 links in 1890 to about 5 in 1937. The differences between spheres are much less marked in Geneva, where the average number of links is maintained in equal proportions throughout the period observed. In Zurich, the average number of links doubled between 1890 and 1910. It then remained constant for the academic and cultural elites, while it decreased for the economic and political elites. A peculiarity of the Zurich patricians is that only the representatives of the economic sphere continued to maintain family ties with the other elites, at a level equivalent to the other city-regions. Although members of patrician families lose importance overall in occupying a smaller percentage of the positions of power as previously observed, the remaining members continue to be well-connected through kinship ties to other elite members.

This form of social closure from the stability of kinship ties between patrician families and the positional elite is also observable through their propensity to maintain family ties with other patricians elites. Figure 7 indicates the average number of ties that patrician have with other patrician and non-patrician elites, taken as an indicator of social closure. On the left, the figure displays the average number of ties to the 4th degree, i.e., to the first cousin; on the right, to the 6th degree, i.e., to the second cousin.

Figure 7. Average number of ties with patrician and non-patrician members of the elite



From figure 7 we again observe a remarkable stability of the average number of ties, which we interpret as evidence of a lasting social closure among the patrician families. This trend is observed both when considering close ties (down to first cousins) and more distant ties (down to second cousins). We could expect that family ties of patrician elites with non-patrician elites would increase over time. However, this is not the case. This means that those patricians who occupy elite positions tend to favor matrimonial alliances with other patrician families. In addition, family ties with non-patrician elites can only be made by affinity (marriages), not by consanguinity. This also helps to explain the stability since, especially in the economic sphere, it is mainly descendants who hold positions of power in private companies.

When displaying results by city-region (figure 8), it becomes clear that it is mainly the Basel and Genevan patricians that on average maintain stronger family ties with other patrician elite members than with non-patrician elite members. By contrast, for the case of Zurich, this difference is neglibible (except in the year 1910). This again highlights the different nature and situation of Zurich's patriciate compared to the one in Basel and Geneva. The latter continue to be socially rather closed and do not open up completely to the new bourgeoisie.

Figure 8. Average number of ties with patrician and non-patrician elite by city-region



From these figures we can make two observations. First, the relative flat shape of the line depicting the number of ties with non-patrician elites (empty squares lines) suggests that over the period, the patrician elite has remained somewhat homogamous. This line – which only captures ties of affinity (see table 3 above) – indeed reflects the degree to which the patricians tended to build alliances through marriage with the new, non-patrician elite[6]. Second, the curves depicting the number of family ties between patrician elite exhibit, likewise, a relatively flat shape[7]. This in turn suggests that the familial nature of power did not in fact vanish over the course of the first half of the 20th century. It shows that the transmission of elite positions via family cooptation, within the family circle, still represented a valid mechanism of power perpetuation. This cooptation operated both vertically, through father-son relationships (typically, the transmission of a family business), and horizontally, through marriage (we cannot however at that stage of our analysis distinguish the quantitative importance of these two types of solidarities). Elite patrician families did not in fact get diluted, like a hasty reading of the result in section 4.1 might lead us to think, and family solidarity within patrician elite circles did not fall apart.

These observations, in combinations, with the results of the section 4.1 (pointing to the decline, in the aggregate, of the presence of patrician families at the top of the power hierarchy in the three cities) do suggest that family cooptation, as a mechanism of power preservation, was not strong enough to prevent the emergence of new elite groups. Or, to put it differently, the decline of patrician power positions is not to be explained by a dilution of family networks. The latter exhibited in fact a clear resilience. This result is at odd with the literature attributing the long-term decline of the elite to the difficulties in transmitting over the generations cultural, economic, or social capital (Evans 2009; Thompson 2019). In addition, our results provide evidence to the view that the patrician elite was in fact quite conservative in its alliance strategies, in line with the patterns observed in other small European countries (Unger and Dronkers 2012). This of course only applies to patricians occupying elite positions as defined in the present article, not to other patricians.

4.3 Business Dynasties

To illustrate continuities and discontinuities in the power of patrician families between 1890 and 1957, we have selected two contrasting examples of urban dynasties: the Pictet family in Geneva and the Geigy family in Basel.

The origins of the dynasty of the Pictet family goes back to the 15th century with Pierre Pictet (1426–1481), a landowner coming from a family of peasants; he was the first Pictet to acquire the title of "bourgeois" of Geneva, in 1474. Building on this new status, the Pictet family, initially composed of three branches, made its fortune by acquiring large estates on the right bank of Lake Geneva, mainly through alliances (Roth, 2010). The first positions of power occupied by members of the family were in the political sphere. Practicing as a notary, Ami Pictet (1535-1607) became in 1575 the first Trustee of the Republic among the members of the clan. He was followed by twelve other family members in a similar position (a municipal officer with some mayoral duties), making the Pictets the most represented family among trustees in the history of Geneva (Roth, 2010). This initial incursion within

[6] Since our database of "positional elites" is essentially composed of men, and since the patrician status is transmitted from father to son, the only way, in this specific context, that a patrician elite can establish a family tie with a non-patrician elite is through marriage.

[7] Family ties between patrician elites include both ties of consanguinity and of affinity. These black curves in other words reflects broader patterns of family relationships than those of marriage. It cannot be interpreted as an indication of the degree to which patrician elites tended to marry other patricians.

the political sphere was quickly followed by the occupation of positions of power in other social spheres. For instance, Pierre Pictet (1703–1768) became a professor of law at the Academy of Geneva and was followed by many other family members embracing an academic career, sometimes at an international level—for example, Marc-Auguste Pictet (1752–1825), a physician who became a Fellow of the Royal Society of London in 1791. For several generations by the early 19th century, the Pictet family had occupied positions of power in the political, academic, and military fields, sometimes with individuals holding multiple positions of power. But the influence of the family did not reach its peak until the Pictets got involved in the banking sector.

The Pictet family has always used alliances with other patrician families to strengthen and perpetuate their power (Mach & Araujo, 2018). It is through this mechanism that they created one of the largest and longest-lasting family-owned private banks in the world. Shortly before he passed away, Jacob-Michel-François de Candolle, cofounder of the Bank Candolle Turettini & Cie, asked Edouard Pictet (1818–1878), the nephew of his wife, to become a partner of his bank. Hence, in 1841, through this kinship, Edouard Pictet became the first banker in the family. In 1848, he renamed the bank Edouard Pictet & Cie. Since then, this bank has been continuously controlled by at least two partners coming from the family, making it the Swiss bank with the oldest family-owned tradition. Ernest Pictet (1829–1909), who served as a partner at the family bank from 1856 until his death in 1909, contributed significatively to the expansion of the influence of the dynasty in the 20th century. Along with his banking activities, he was the founder of the Geneva Chamber of Commerce in 1865 and a federal deputy until 1893. His progeny is illustrative of the continuity of the Pictet family at positions of power. Figure 10 displays a genealogical tree that was generated from our database that combines family ties with indication of power positions occupies in the different social spheres. His older son, Aimé Pictet (1857–1937), became a professor of chemistry at the University of Geneva and cofounded the Swiss Chemical Society. The second son, Guillaume Pictet (1860–1926), became the leading partner of the family bank and an elected official in the canton. His younger brother, Paul-Edmond Pictet (1862–1947), was elected president of the Grand Council of Geneva in 1919. These three brothers alone are ancestors to more than twenty other members of the family who occupied a position of power during the 20th century, mainly in the political, academic, and economic spheres. This transmission of elite positions through family members has been strengthen with affiliation through strong patrician families such as Mirabaud, Turrettini, Paccard, Naville or Cramer, often involved in kinship ties with the Pictets.

Interestingly, alliances with patrician families not only perpetuate the dynasty of the Pictet family in their traditional social fields but they also extend the family's spectrum of influence. For instance, although members of the clan in the direct lineage do not often occupy positions of power in the cultural field and more specifically in leading positions in fine art societies, through alliances the Pictet family is still represented in those spheres. Adèle Pictet (1836–1917), the daughter of François Pictet-de la Rive (1809–1872), a political and academic elite, married in 1855. Her husband, Théodore de Saussure (1824–1903), who then became associated with the Pictets by marriage and was from a patrician family, was the president of the Geneva Fine Arts Society. Similarly, Guillaume Fatio (1865–1958), a banker who was also later president of the Geneva Fine Arts Society and came from a patrician family, married Marguerite Pictet (1870–1952) in 1892.

In contrast with the continuity of the dynasty of the Pictet family in the first half of the 20th century and afterwards, the case of the Geigy family is a good illustration of how the direct influence of a family's direct lineage decreased as its power, specifically within the economic field, was diluted by several families with ties to it. Originally from Basel, the Geigy family acquired the status of "bourgeois" in 1639 through a marriage between Thomas Geigy (born 1600), a miller, and Katharina

Figure 10. Genealogical tree for the Pictet family



Figure 11. Genealogical tree for the Geigy family



Merian (born 1603). In 1687, the family entered the political field as descendants of Thomas Geigy were elected to the Grand Council of Basel-Stadt (Schmidt-Ott, 2005). In 1758, Johann Rudolf Geigy (1733–1793) opened a drugstore, J.R. Geigy; this marked the ascension of the family within the economic field. Thanks to his marriage to Anna Elisabeth Gemuseus and the marriage of his son, Hieronymus, to Charlotte Sarasin, Johann Rudolf developed an extended network with local families of traders, manufacturers and patrician families, helping him to develop his business. His grandson, Karl Geigy (1798–1861), after taking over the J.R. Geigy company, created in 1840 the pharmaceutical firm Geigy & Bernoulli, with his partner Leonhard Bernoulli. Karl's son, Johann Rudolf Geigy (1830–1917) modernized the company and turned it into one of the most important companies in the Basel region by the end of the 19th century (Bürgin, 1958). Johann Rudolf Geigy occupied multiple positions of power in Basel. He cofounded the Basel Chamber of Commerce (and ran it from 1891 to 1898) and the Commercial Bank of Basel (president, 1893–1913). While the next generations followed in his footsteps by taking over the family-owned business, the power within the company and in other social fields was progressively given to indirect descendants of Johann Rudolf Geigy (figure 11).

Rudolf Geigy (1862–1943) and Karl Geigy (1866–1949), both sons of Johann Rudolf, and his nephew, Karl Koechlin (1856–1914) all became members of the board of directors of the company, taking part in the development of the family business in the early 20th century. However, by the mid-20th century, most of the members of the company board of directors came either from a family not related to the Geigy family or only linked at more than one degree of kinship. The genealogical tree of Johann Rudolf Geigy illustrates this dynamic. While his descendants still occupy positions of power in the economic and political fields, the name Geigy has tended to disappear. This illustrates the importance of the women in the Geigy family in connecting with other male elites outside of the direct lineage.

5. Conclusion

In this contribution we addressed the declining power of the Swiss patrician families from 1890 to 1957. Building on a systematic database of local elites in the three major Swiss city-regions (Basel, Geneva, and Zurich), we combined historical and sociological approaches to question the evolution of positional power and kinship networks of the Swiss urban power elite over seventy years. Such a strategy helped us to develop comparisons between the three city-regions of Basel, Geneva, and Zurich, over time, and across four social spheres: academic, economic, political, and cultural.

When first focusing on the long-term presence of representatives of old patrician families at the head of different local organizations and institutions in different social spheres and in different city-regions, we clearly observed a generalized trend toward a decline in the percentage of positions occupied by patrician family members. However, we noticed differences between the city-regions. Especially, patrician families in Zurich have lost their hegemony quicker as in the two other cities. The major reasons are the geographical organization of the canton, which allowed more contestation from the rural population since the 19th century already. By contrast, the cases of Basel and Geneva showed a greater preservation of the power of the patriciate, more preserved from contestations. Our analysis also highlights differences between the spheres: the patrician influence generally lasted longer in the economic and cultural spheres, while it was somewhat shorter in the academic sphere and definitely shorter in the political sphere.

This confirmed decline in positions of power does not, however, translate into a loss of kinship ties between patrician with other elites, similarly to what has been shown by Rieder (2008) for the city

of Bern, where "despite a clear decline of their general influence, old patrician families have remained very well organized in traditional Zünfte (local guilds) and have maintained major influence on some aspects of urban governance". For those patricians who remain members of the local elite from 1937 onward, the average number of ties to members of the elite remains remarkably constant. Moreover, our analysis has shown that relationships of consanguinity and affinity continue to involve patricians in the first place. These observations both confirm and contrast with the literature. While focuses on the Swiss case rather argue toward an extended social openness to the non-patrician elite from the beginning of the 20th century (Sarasin, 1998; Perroux, 2006), our observations seem to attest of a long-lasting social closure of the patrician elite, at least for those who occupy power positions. On the differences between the cities, our analysis rather confirms that Geneva patriciate tends to be a bit more open than the Basel's one. Our results are moreover in line with Tanner's (1998) findings, which highlighted that the Zurich's patriciate have tended to mix more with the newcomers, in particular from 1890 onwards. Our results also highlight the persistence of family cooptation, i.e., the transmission of elite positions within the family circle, as an efficient mechanism of power perpetuation. It also contributed to prevent family dilution. These results in other words suggest that the decline of patrician families is not to be attributed to a collapse of the channels of capital transmission across generations, which contrasts with Buddenbrooks-like explanations of family decline. From our observation we argue rather for the existence of conservative alliance strategies and closure mechanism of patrician families.

These results open various avenues for further research. On the one hand, it seems necessary to carry out work on the more recent period, in order to understand to what extent the identified mechanisms are extended even further in time. On the other hand, it is crucial to analyze in more detail the matrimonial alliances and, in particular, the rate of maintenance of the homogamy of the patrician elites. Our data and our perspective have not allowed us to develop these points here. However, it remains certain that they deserve special attention in future research.

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Appendix 1. Table for figures 1-4

	City-Region	Year	Sphere	Total (n)	Before 1800 (n)	Before 1800 (%)	After 1800 (n)	After 1800 (%)	No (n)	No (%)	NA (n)	NA (%)
1	Basel	1890	Academic	65	19	29.2	14	21.5	27	41.5	5	7.7
2	Basel	1890	Culture	15	11	73.3	2	13.3	1	6.7	1	6.7
3	Basel	1890	Economic	109	57	52.3	12	11.0	22	20.2	18	16.5
4	Basel	1890	Politics	135	41	30.4	20	14.8	13	9.6	61	45.2
6	Basel	1890	Total	297	112	37.7	45	15.2	58	19.5	82	27.6
7	Geneva	1890	Academic	57	31	54.4	8	14.0	15	26.3	3	5.3
8	Geneva	1890	Culture	12	8	66.7	1	8.3	0	0.0	3	25.0
9	Geneva	1890	Economic	95	56	58.9	10	10.5	12	12.6	17	17.9
10	Geneva	1890	Politics	139	44	31.7	19	13.7	23	16.5	53	38.1
12	Geneva	1890	Total	283	127	44.9	32	11.3	48	17.0	76	26.9
13	Zurich	1890	Academic	57	7	12.3	20	35.1	22	38.6	8	14.0
14	Zurich	1890	Culture	9	5	55.6	2	22.2	1	11.1	1	11.1
15	Zurich	1890	Economic	177	41	23.2	52	29.4	57	32.2	27	15.3
16	Zurich	1890	Politics	321	30	9.3	69	21.5	69	21.5	153	47.7
18	Zurich	1890	Total	534	73	13.7	132	24.7	142	26.6	187	35.0
19	Basel	1910	Academic	89	20	22.5	18	20.2	41	46.1	10	11.2
20	Basel	1910	Culture	14	8	57.1	5	35.7	1	7.1	0	0.0
21	Basel	1910	Economic	143	61	42.7	17	11.9	37	25.9	28	19.6
22	Basel	1910	Politics	142	18	12.7	20	14.1	9	6.3	95	66.9
24	Basel	1910	Total	376	99	26.3	62	16.5	87	23.1	128	34.0
25	Geneva	1910	Academic	78	27	34.6	22	28.2	24	30.8	5	6.4
26	Geneva	1910	Culture	15	8	53.3	3	20.0	1	6.7	3	20.0
27	Geneva	1910	Economic	101	47	46.5	13	12.9	17	16.8	24	23.8
28	Geneva	1910	Politics	146	34	23.3	21	14.4	13	8.9	78	53.4
30	Geneva	1910	Total	323	107	33.1	51	15.8	55	17.0	110	34.1
31	Zurich	1910	Academic	85	11	12.9	31	36.5	38	44.7	5	5.9
32	Zurich	1910	Culture	15	2	13.3	4	26.7	7	46.7	2	13.3
33	Zurich	1910	Economic	158	28	17.7	58	36.7	52	32.9	20	12.7
34	Zurich	1910	Politics	349	14	4.0	120	34.4	50	14.3	165	47.3
36	Zurich	1910	Total	578	50	8.7	191	33.0	144	24.9	193	33.4
37	Basel	1937	Academic	124	24	19.4	32	25.8	42	33.9	26	21.0
38	Basel	1937	Culture	13	5	38.5	2	15.4	0	0.0	6	46.2
39	Basel	1937	Economic	121	38	31.4	20	16.5	32	26.4	31	25.6
40	Basel	1937	Politics	148	9	6.1	17	11.5	10	6.8	112	75.7
42	Basel	1937	Total	400	73	18.3	74	18.5	85	21.3	168	42.0
43	Geneva	1937	Academic	94	21	22.3	26	27.7	46	48.9	1	1.1
44	Geneva	1937	Culture	23	10	43.5	3	13.0	2	8.7	8	34.8
45	Geneva	1937	Economic	93	36	38.7	22	23.7	17	18.3	18	19.4
46	Geneva	1937	Politics	161	12	7.5	14	8.7	20	12.4	115	71.4
48	Geneva	1937	Total	370	80	21.6	62	16.8	86	23.2	142	38.4
49	Zurich	1937	Academic	95	10	10.5	24	25.3	48	50.5	13	13.7
50	Zurich	1937	Culture	18	2	11.1	8	44.4	7	38.9	1	5.6
51	Zurich	1937	Economic	176	23	13.1	54	30.7	64	36.4	35	19.9
52	Zurich	1937	Politics	304	4	1.3	88	28.9	32	10.5	180	59.2
54	Zurich	1937	Total	578	39	6.7	165	28.5	146	25.3	228	39.4
55	Basel	1957	Academic	145	11	7.6	36	24.8	55	37.9	43	29.7
56	Basel	1957	Culture	15	0	0.0	7	46.7	2	13.3	6	40.0
57	Basel	1957	Economic	114	26	22.8	15	13.2	38	33.3	35	30.7

58	Basel	1957	Politics	143	5	3.5	24	16.8	9	6.3	105	73.4
60	Basel	1957	Total	408	40	9.8	82	20.1	102	25.0	184	45.1
61	Geneva	1957	Academic	126	20	15.9	40	31.7	63	50.0	3	2.4
62	Geneva	1957	Culture	16	5	31.3	1	6.3	3	18.8	7	43.8
63	Geneva	1957	Economic	117	31	26.5	26	22.2	25	21.4	35	29.9
64	Geneva	1957	Politics	177	10	5.6	16	9.0	17	9.6	134	75.7
66	Geneva	1957	Total	441	67	15.2	81	18.4	114	25.9	179	40.6
67	Zurich	1957	Academic	126	6	4.8	23	18.3	78	61.9	19	15.1
68	Zurich	1957	Culture	21	0	0.0	10	47.6	8	38.1	3	14.3
69	Zurich	1957	Economic	165	22	13.3	42	25.5	62	37.6	39	23.6
70	Zurich	1957	Politics	319	3	0.9	40	12.5	36	11.3	240	75.2
72	Zurich	1957	Total	612	32	5.2	111	18.1	173	28.3	296	48.4

Appendix 2. Most important patrician families with their number of positions of power

	patronym	region	Academic	Culture	Economic	no_sphere	Politics	Sum
1	Burckhardt	Basel	15	5	25	0	12	57
2	Vischer	Basel	5	0	26	0	4	35
3	Sarasin	Basel	6	2	21	0	2	31
4	Pictet	Geneva	4	2	13	0	6	25
5	Sulzer	Winterthur	0	0	25	0	0	25
6	Staehelin	Basel	9	2	8	0	1	20
7	Merian	Basel	4	1	13	0	1	19
8	Iselin	Basel	3	1	10	0	4	18
9	Escher	Zurich	2	0	11	0	4	17
10	Frey	Zurich	4	0	10	0	2	16
11	Koechlin	Basel	2	0	11	0	3	16
12	Mühll, von der	Basel	2	1	12	0	1	16
13	La Roche	Basel	1	0	13	0	0	14
14	Gautier	Geneva	4	2	6	0	1	13
15	Hentsch	Geneva	0	0	13	0	0	13
16	Hoffmann	Basel	1	1	11	0	0	13
17	Oltramare	Geneva	9	0	4	0	0	13
18	Huber	Zurich	2	0	8	0	2	12
19	Naville	Geneva	3	2	6	0	1	12
20	Riggenbach	Basel	6	0	5	0	1	12
21	Schulthess	Zurich	2	1	7	0	2	12
22	Bernoulli	Basel	4	2	2	0	3	11
23	Geigy	Basel	1	0	9	0	1	11
24	Turrettini	Geneva	0	2	7	0	2	11
25	Firmenich	Geneva	0	1	9	0	0	10
26	Lombard	Geneva	0	0	9	0	1	10
27	Reinhart	Winterthur	1	1	8	0	0	10
28	Hagenbach	Basel	6	0	2	0	1	9
29	Preiswerk	Basel	2	0	4	0	3	9
30	Bouvier	Geneva	2	0	2	1	3	8
31	Pestalozzi	Zurich	1	1	5	0	1	8
32	Saussure, de	Geneva	1	4	3	0	0	8