

Université de Lausanne
Faculté des Sciences Sociales et Politiques

THE REDEFINITION OF INTEREST GROUP STRATEGIES IN
SWITZERLAND: FROM CORPORATIST BARGAINING TO
PLURALIST COMPETITION

PhD proposal in political science

Steven Eichenberger (PhD student SNF, IEPI, LAGAPE)
steven.eichenberger@unil.ch

Under the supervision of :

André Mach, MER (Université de Lausanne, IEPI, LAGAPE)
Prof. Frédéric Varone (Université de Genève)

Number of characters: 67'348

Lausanne, 26th of September 2014

SUMMARY

This thesis proposal suggests studying the strategies of influence used by different types of interest groups in Switzerland since the beginning of the 1990s. It is questionable whether interest group activities and strategies in Switzerland can still be considered to resemble a liberal-conservative version of neocorporatism. Significant institutional changes related to the revalorization of parliament, pressures put on corporatist actors due to globalization, as well as the mediatization of politics in general, warrant taking a renewed look at interest group strategies in Switzerland. This proposal suggests conducting both a macro-level (system) and micro-level (policy processes) analysis of IG activities within and across different institutional venues, with a particular emphasis on the parliamentary and direct democratic venues. Accordingly, three hypotheses are put forward. First, it will be analyzed whether traditional corporatist arrangements have resurfaced within parliament. Second, it will be analyzed whether the mediatization of politics also informs the use of direct democratic tools by IGs. Concretely, it will be analyzed whether there is an affirmation of the logic of membership in the use of direct democratic tools by IGs. Third, as the direct democratic venue shares with the media venue its tight link to the general public, it will be analyzed whether public interest groups display patterns of venue choice different from those of business interest groups. These hypotheses will be investigated by relying both on quantitative and qualitative data.

SUMMARY	2
1. INTRODUCTION	4
2. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK.....	5
A. STUDYING INTEREST GROUP STRATEGIES	5
B. THE PLURALIST SCHOOL.....	6
C. NEOCORPORATISM.....	7
D. THE NEO-PLURALIST APPROACH	8
3. INTEREST GROUPS IN SWITZERLAND.....	12
A. THE TRADITIONAL CORPORATIST MODEL	12
B. THE REVIVAL OF PARLIAMENT.....	12
C. THE REDEFINITION OF INTEREST GROUP STRATEGIES.....	14
4. RESEARCH QUESTIONS.....	15
A. MOVING TOWARDS PARLIAMENTARY CORPORATISM?.....	15
B. MOVING TOWARDS MEDIATIZED DIRECT DEMOCRACY?	18
C. CHOOSING BATTLEFIELDS: ADMINISTRATION, PARLIAMENT AND DIRECT DEMOCRACY.....	21
5. METHODS.....	23
A. MACRO-LEVEL ANALYSIS.....	23
B. MICRO-LEVEL ANALYSIS.....	23
6. TIMETABLE.....	25
7. BIBLIOGRAPHY	26

1. INTRODUCTION

Until the beginning of the 1990s the Swiss system of interest representation could be characterized as a “liberal-conservative” version of neocorporatism. The link between civil society and the state passed through powerful intermediary organizations: peak business associations, and their junior partners, trade unions. However, over the course of the past 20 years, the institutional context wherein interest groups operate has undergone considerable change. The introduction of permanent legislative committees and better financial remuneration for parliamentary work have lifted parliament out of the shadow of the pre-parliamentary phase, dominated by the administration and corporatist peak associations. Moreover, globalization has exacerbated tensions within corporatist interest groups, as it accentuates the opposition between domestic and export-oriented sectors of the Swiss economy. Linked to globalization, media has become an autonomous force in politics, no longer willing to toe the party line, and more concerned with sales figures rather than substantive politics. At the same time, the study of interest groups in Switzerland has changed as well since the beginning of the 1990s. It has become neglected, strangely so. This thesis proposal hence suggests to study the strategies of influence used by different types of interest groups within this altered context. It suggests doing so along three axes: strategies employed within the parliamentary venue, strategies employed within the direct democratic venue, and the strategic choice between the pre-parliamentary (administrative), parliamentary and direct democratic venues.

Beyond contributing to a better understanding of interest groups’ strategies in the Swiss context, this thesis proposal also suggests making a contribution to the international literature on interest group strategies. Unlike political parties, interest groups do not seek to win elections. This is about as far as the consensus goes on what actually constitutes an interest group (Baumgartner and Leech 1998, 22–25). A corollary of this definition is that interest groups’ influence on public policy is moderated by legislators and bureaucrats. That is, interest groups influence legislators and bureaucrats, which in turn elaborate and decide on public policy. However, this boundary between political parties and interest groups can be blurred. This thesis project focuses on two dimensions of interest group behavior which contribute to the blurring of this boundary: the establishment of institutionalized ties to members of parliament, on the one hand, and the elaboration of legislation by interest groups via direct democratic means on the other.

This proposal is structured as follows. First, the analytical framework enabling a thorough analysis of interest group strategies will be presented. It does not limit itself to a single approach to the study of interest groups. Rather it ties together different theoretical frameworks enabling a better understanding of interest groups strategies. Second, the changing institutional context in Switzerland will be highlighted. Third, the general research question will be broken down along the three different axes presented above. Fourth, the methods allowing these questions to be answered will be sketched out.

2. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

A. STUDYING INTEREST GROUP STRATEGIES

When confronted with the complexity of studying interest groups, it is helpful to employ the concept of the “influence production process” (Lowery and Brasher 2004; Lowery and Gray 2004). It separates research on interest groups into four interrelated stages of influence production: mobilization, interest community¹, activities and strategies, and political outcome. Our research concentrates on the activities and particularly strategies of interest groups.

Binderkrantz (2008, 194) mentions that “interest group strategies are, at the bottom line, worth our attention because of the results groups achieve by engaging themselves in such strategies”. That is, because of the influence groups can exert. But, *why do we need to study interest groups’ strategies in order to understand their influence? Why not simply focus on interest groups’ characteristics or institutional factors and measure influence directly?*

Dür (2008, 1218) replies that “if groups always adopted ideal strategies, strategies would only be an intermediary variable that is perfectly explained by a group’s resources, the institutional framework and so forth, and hence could be ignored in attempts at explaining interest group influence” (Dür 2008, 1218). Elsewhere he further states that “strategies are an independent variable in studies of influence if, and only if, they are not fully determined by factors that also have a direct impact on influence” (Dür and Mateo 2013, 662).

However, this is tantamount to saying that an interest group can have influence without acting. There are no factors “having a direct impact on influence”. Any interest group has to do something in order to actually have influence. Strategies require actors, embedded within a certain context, in order to become influence. If a group sometimes fails to adopt the ideal strategy, the cause is not the strategy. Rather, the cause is to be found by looking the “group’s resources, the institutional framework, and so forth”. Thus, strategies are an intermediary variable, not an independent variable. One could reply that it is important to study strategies precisely because interest groups sometimes do not choose the ideal strategy. That is, they do not choose the strategy allowing them to maximize their influence. However, this means that we first need to measure influence before we can actually determine the ideal strategy, which throws us back to the initial question of why we should study strategies and not influence. The question hence remains why we should study this intermediary variable.

There are at least three reasons justifying the study of interest group strategies. First, understanding what interest groups do, can give us some clues about interest groups’ influence. There is no straightforward connection between strategies and outcome. There is no winning strategy enabling

¹ Here the focus is put on the “carrying capacity” of political systems for interest group *populations*. It is tightly linked to the mobilization stage. However, rather than focusing on the members’ incentives to join a group and the problem of collective action, this approach takes into account contextual factors, which have an impact on population characteristics (e.g. population density and diversity). For instance, if government is actively pursuing the development of public policy in a given area, this will lead to the creation of interest groups and hence increase the population density (see Gray and Lowery 1996). Therefore, depending on contextual factors, interest group populations can be very differently constituted from one issue area to another (or from one country to another). This can also have a bearing on interest group strategies. For instance, in an area where very few business interest groups are present, public interest groups might be able to adopt insider strategies (see Section 2d).

an interest group to always achieve its objective. Contextual factors make the measurement of influence extremely difficult. Still, some strategies are arguably better than others. Being able to follow an issue through all venues is probably better than being present only in the media. Being able to work in a coalition is probably better than to work alone. Establishing which type of interest group can make use of which strategy can thus give us some idea about different interest groups' ability to influence the policy-making process. Second, we can study strategies in order to test and elaborate on theories of influence, as strategies are the central element in the causal chain leading from interest groups and their environment to actual influence. Studying strategies can help us understand how certain interest group can exert influence. Third, interest groups' strategies lead to "patterns of representation" of different types of interest groups in different venues (Binderkrantz, Christiansen, and Pedersen 2014). Studying strategies can hence allow us to establish "whether different groups have the same opportunities to actually be heard" (Binderkrantz 2008, 173). Here the study of influence is only of secondary importance. In the following three subsections, three different approaches to study of interest group strategies will be presented.

B. THE PLURALIST SCHOOL

Baumgartner and Leech (1998, 44–63) provide a succinct overview of the "group approach to politics". During the 1950s and the beginning of the 1960s, the group approach was not merely an approach to understanding interest group politics. Rather, it was considered to explain *all* politics. According to this "disturbance theory", interest groups mobilize in response to a threat (Truman 1951). Political outcomes are the result of an iterative process of mobilizations and counter-mobilizations. This iteration continues until a balance representing all interests in society is reached. Therefore, scholars of this approach considered parliament as only "ratifying the victories of the successful coalitions" (Latham 1952, 35–36; cited in, Schattschneider 1960, 43). As the "pressure system", that is the interest group population, accurately reflects the needs of society, party politics become somewhat redundant and exert only a control function.² Pluralists hence focused on how different interest groups keep each other in check, not on whether the interest groups present within the pressure system really did represent the needs of society. By consequence, the debate among pluralists focused on the difficulties of measuring power, rather than establishing which segments of society participate in the pluralist struggle.³ However, by the end of the 1960s it had become clear that the pressure system does not really represent a microcosm of society.⁴ The main observation was the strong upper-class bias in the pressure system (Schattschneider 1960, 30–35).

Olson (1965) then provided a theoretical underpinning for the observed bias in mobilization of interests. He showed that collective action problems impede mobilization around certain societal

² This represents, however, a somewhat stylized account of the pluralist school. Jordan (2000) shows that Truman, for instance, did not consider politics to be entirely determined by the pressure system. Rather, what many pluralists have in common is to point out that politics cannot be understood without looking at interest groups. This is the main lesson we draw from the pluralist school.

³ Not surprisingly then, the 1950s represented the gilded age of the reputational approach to the measurement of power (see, Wolfinger 1960).

⁴ A discourse analytical approach would put the focus on how culturally defined parameters limit the formulation of interests in the first place. In a similar vein, a Gramscian approach would probably consider most interest groups as the product of the cultural hegemony of the ruling class. For these approaches, whether the pressure system represents a microcosm of society is the wrong question to ask. While these approaches are certainly necessary, we focus on whether and how societal interests are voiced within the political system.

interests. What followed was a narrowing in scope of the research program on interest groups. Instead of focusing on how different groups influence political outcome, the main focus was put on the mobilization stage. Rather than assuming that interest groups automatically mobilize in response to a threat, the central question became how interest groups actually mobilize. Olson, of course, pointed to the importance of selective benefits. However, Salisbury (1969) pointed to the importance of entrepreneurs in overcoming collective action problems. These are willing to invest capital in order to allow citizens to draw not only material, but also non-material, “expressive” benefits (see also, Cook 1984). The underlying model stipulates that citizens are willing to pay in order to be able to express their adherence to a certain cause. Lowery and Gray (2004, 165–166; Lowery and Brasher 2004, 21–22) have termed the research inspired by Olson as part of the “transaction school”. It focuses “on the specific exchanges that go on between interest organizations and both their members and government officials” (Lowery and Brasher 2004, 21). It enters our analytical framework because interest groups’ strategies cannot be understood without taking into account this “internal” dimension. Members represent both a resource and a constraint on interest group activities.

C. *NEOCORPORATISM*

Faced with the reality of a handful of encompassing, hierarchically structured peak business associations and trade unions dominating interest intermediation, European scholars have developed the so-called neo-corporatist approach in the late 1970s. The key analytical term at the heart of the neocorporatist approach is “political exchange” (Molina and Rhodes 2002; Hassenteufel 1990). In return for political support, the state provides certain encompassing groups with institutionalized access to and hence influence on public policymaking. This leads both to uncontested public policy and the satisfaction of the interest group members’ concerns. The neocorporatist approach thus puts the focus on how the representativeness of a group leads to government recognition, and how government recognition can increase representativeness as it allows a group to better represent its members, by granting them direct participation in the elaboration of economic and social policies.⁵ Unlike the transactions school, the neocorporatist approach focuses on the interaction between the internal and external dimensions of an interest group. The activities of corporatist actors follow both the logic of membership (internal dimension) and the logic of influence (external dimension) (Schmitter and Streeck 1999). This approach helped accounting for the monopolistic position held by encompassing organizations within small European states, such as Austria, the Netherlands and others (Schmitter 1974). The relationship between the state and interest groups is rather mutualistic; they both rely on each other in order to represent legitimate social institutions. Moreover, the relationship is institutionalized, often within extra-parliamentary committees, but also in the form of parliamentary mandates held by interest group representatives. Societal conflict is, to a great extent, “handed down” a level, and takes place *within* the encompassing organizations where different sectoral organizations try to achieve congruence between their objectives and the ones the interest group eventually defends in negotiations with the state and other corporatist actors. The remaining societal conflict is at the center of a bargaining process between corporatist interest groups and the state. Therefore, within the neocorporatist approach, the analysis of strategies of influence essentially focuses on strategic bargaining, on how corporatist actors defend their position and present their room to negotiate. This interdependence amongst IGs leading to cooperation and

⁵ In the Swiss case, for instance, government subsidies aimed at the creation of peak associations as the sole interlocutor of the state (see Mach 2014).

negotiation is absent from the pluralist approach. There has been an extensive debate as to whether neocorporatism has been in decline due to socio-economic change and demise of demand-side macro-economic steering. Some authors argue that neocorporatism can survive based on different forms of political exchange (Molina and Rhodes 2002). Other authors point to the continued existence of neocorporatist arrangements on a sectoral level, so-called meso-corporatism (Blom-Hansen 2001). We take from neocorporatism its insistence on the interrelationship between the internal and external dimension, as well as its implication that strategic behavior by IGs can take the form of strategic bargaining.

D. THE NEO-PLURALIST APPROACH

Unlike Baumgartner and Leech (1998), Lowery and Gray (2004) as well as Lowery and Brasher (2004) are more lenient in their evaluation of the general state of interest group research. These authors contend that the weight of the collective action problem has been overstated. Organization spending on selective benefits does not make the pursuit of collective goods impossible. They hence ascertain that “many different types of organizations will enter lobbying communities reflecting a broad array of interests” (Lowery and Gray 2004, 166). And even though this community might not accurately reflect the desires and needs of society, it is still considered a worthy endeavor to understand why these organizations behave as they do and whether they are successful in achieving their objectives. Lowery, Gray, and Brasher contend that several authors have indeed taken the heterogeneity of interests present within the pressure system as the starting point of their research. They speak of a burgeoning “neo-pluralist” perspective, which pays close attention to how different types of interest groups behave and underlines the importance of contingency when studying interest groups. Moreover, rather than reaching broad conclusions such as “business dominates”, this literature points to how contextual factors might influence the nature of the interest community, the strategies applied and the influence achieved. The neo-pluralist perspective thus builds on both the pluralist and transactions schools; however, it pays closer attention to the factors influencing the nature of interest group populations and the great variety of strategies employed by interest groups. In terms of the influence production process, the neo-pluralist approach spans all four stages and points to the necessity of taking into account the interrelationships between the different stages.

Conceptual ambiguities

Concerning the study of the strategies of interest groups we have indeed witnessed a great increase since Baumgartner and Leech (1998, xvii) claimed the study of interest groups to be “elegantly irrelevant”. Before briefly sketching out the most important contributions to the study of interest group strategies over the past 15 years, it is important to clarify what is actually meant by the terms (1) interest groups, (2) strategies as opposed to tactics, and (3) venues as opposed to arenas.

(1) As Jordan and Maloney (2007, 26) mention “recognizing the interest group beast when it is seen may be easier than defining it in the abstract”. These two authors point out two different understandings of interest group term. The first one finds its roots in the pluralist school and considers *any* organization attempting to influence public policy an interest group. Jordan and Maloney (2007, 28) further point out that “this definition is policy-studies oriented: it centers on the *policy influencing* role of groups. It has also been termed a “functional” definition of interest groups. Elsewhere Jordan et al. (2004, 200) argue that “the most important consequence of this approach is the fact that in this light an individual company can be seen as an interest group”. The second one considers interest groups as “representational vehicles”. An interest group serves to represent the

interests of its members who by themselves would be unable to voice their opinion adequately. Jordan et al. (2004) suggest that in order to avoid conceptual overstretching, the term interest group should only apply to membership-based groups. All other organizations attempting to influence public policy should be termed “pressure participants”. Within the neo-pluralist literature, this distinction does not seem to have gained much traction. Most approaches continue to rely on a functional definition of interest groups (Bouwen 2004; Mahoney 2008; Baumgartner et al. 2009; Braun 2012; Boehmke, Gailmard, and Patty 2013; however, Binderkrantz, Christiansen, and Pedersen 2014). Along with Jordan et al. (2004), we agree that it does make a difference whether an interest group is a membership organization or not, particularly if we wish to understand its strategic choices. However, rather than conceptually distinguishing between pressure participants and interest groups, we side with the functional/behavioral definition adopted by most authors. It is important though to point out that “background characteristics” (Baroni et al. 2014), such as whether an interest group is membership based, play a central role in understanding interest group strategies (see below).

(2) Pralle (2010, 190) mentions that “an essential part of political advocacy involves deciding how to go about influencing the policy process. These choices as a whole are considered to be the “strategy” of an advocacy group”. Rather than speaking of strategies, Baumgartner et al. (2009, 278) speak of “tactics”, as the actions interest groups take in order to accomplish their objectives on an issue. There does not seem to be a great difference in the use of these two terms. Still, we understand tactics to be particular elements of a larger strategy. For instance, holding press conferences and writing opinion pieces in newspapers are two different tactics, but both part of an outsider strategy.

(3) Pralle (2010, 179–180) also brings some conceptual clarity to the terms arena and venue when she states that “both venues and arenas are potential sites of competition over policy issues, but only venues issue authoritative decisions about specific issues”. Policy arenas, on the other hand, are non-authoritative locations. Within the media arena, for instance, the political agenda can be set and policy issues can be influenced indirectly, but no decisions backed by sanctions can be made.⁶

Strategies

The neo-pluralist approach hence put part of the focus on interest groups’ strategies and over the past 15 years there has been quite some development in this field. In the following, we provide a brief overview of the most significant contributions.

Kollman (1998, 91), shows that public interest groups make more use of so-called *outsider strategies* than business interest groups. Outsider strategies are indirect strategies as interest groups try to influence the behavior of legislators by appealing to the general public. They contrast with *insider strategies*, that is, direct access to legislators or bureaucrats. Kollman then further provides a theoretical argument that interest groups need to estimate whether their proposed policy solution actually enjoys support within the general public before attempting to *expand conflict* (Kollman 1998, 131). He was thus one of the first researchers to take into account, at least on a theoretical level, how an issue-specific variable⁷ would impact lobbying strategies. Building on Kollman, Gerber (1999) shows how different types of interest groups use different direct democratic tools. The direct democracy strategy can also be considered an outsider strategy. It shares with a media strategy the aim of expanding conflict and appealing to the public at large. She argues that business interest

⁶ Still, both terms are often used interchangeably (see Binderkrantz, Christiansen, and Pedersen 2014).

⁷ Here, the popularity of a certain policy solution.

groups prefer the referendum to the popular initiative as it allows them to achieve influence more cheaply. A successful initiative campaign requires a large membership, which business interest groups do not have and cannot compensate for with financial resources. She is more explicit than Kollman as concerns the theoretical link between interest group type and choice of a strategy. However, she does not focus on the choice between pursuing an insider strategy and making use of direct democratic tools.

Baumgartner et al. (2009, 154–157) then put this finding into question when they show that *intent*, that is, whether an interest groups wishes to maintain or challenge the status quo, seems to inform the choice of insider versus outsider strategies. Also, they contend that the salience of an issue does not impact the insider-outsider strategy choice.

Holyoke (2003) does not focus on the venue shopping strategies of different types of interest groups, but he shows that the choice to lobby in a particular venue also depends upon the number of *opposing interests* and on whether an interest group is part of a *coalition*. Moreover, he introduced the concept of the *intensity* of lobbying, that is, the resources an interest group decides to invest in a certain venue. Other authors (for instance, Mahoney 2007) focus on the determinants of coalition behavior, rather than considering coalitions an independent variable explaining the venue choice.

Pralle (2010, 193) introduces the concept of *venue shifting*. Hereby she means interest groups carrying an issue into a new, “untapped” venue wherein it enjoys a first-mover advantage. Venue shifting needs to be distinguished from venue *shopping*. The latter concept tackles the question of why an interest group decides to lobby in one (set of) venue(s), but not another (Holyoke 2003, 325). That is, the choice of a particular “battleground”. This might be an “untapped” venue, but, under certain circumstances, interest group might also become active in venues where they face great opposition. Therefore, venue shifting is a form of venue shopping.⁸ Pralle’s contribution is also important as she shows that the choice of venue is not always based on a pure cost-benefit analysis, but can also be influenced by organizational identity.

A further important question concerns the *target* of lobbying activities. Hall and Deardorff (2006) tackle the question as to whether interest group representatives lobby friends or foes. They claim that “the proximate objective of this strategy [legislative lobbying] is *not* to change legislators’ minds but to assist natural allies in achieving their own, coincident objectives” (Hall and Deardorff 2006, 69). The approach is based on the assumption that legislators’ resources are scarce lobbyist possess more expertise than legislators. In this sense, interest groups can have influence if they provide the right (costly) information at the right moment.

Interest group types and background characteristics

Typologies of interest groups can be considered a by-product of Schattschneider’s defense of party politics. His critique of the group approach is based on the claim that a distinction between public and special interests must be made. He states that “to abolish the distinction is to make a shambles of political science” (Schattschneider 1960, 27). He claimed that public interests are “shared by all, or substantially all members of the community” (Schattschneider 1960, 23). According to pluralist

⁸ Pralle does not make a clear distinction between the two concepts. She mentions that “venue shopping refers to the activities of advocacy groups and policymakers who seek out a decision setting where they can air their grievances with current policy and present alternative policy proposals” (Pralle 2003, 233). She seems to refer to those “untapped” venues where there is actually space to “air grievances”.

scholars, however, there are only special interests. Foreshadowing Olson, Schattschneider points out that “when pressure-group organizations attempt to represent the interests of large numbers of people, they are usually able to reach only a small segment of their constituencies” (Schattschneider 1960, 35). As political parties cannot rule without majority support, these are more able to define and defend public interests than interest groups.⁹ However, he still speaks of so-called “public interest pressure groups” (Schattschneider 1960, 47), which can be distinguished from special interest groups on the basis of whether they seek exclusive or non-exclusive benefits and the composition of the group. This is the origin of the main distinctive criterion running through most interest group typologies in use nowadays: broad/public versus narrow/economic interests. At first then the typology was purely descriptive as it served examining the relative presence of the different types of interest groups within the pressure system (Schlozman 1984).

It is important to note that public interest groups do not actually defend an interest “shared by all or substantially all members of society”. They propose a certain version of the public interests. The neo-pluralist literature does not study strategies of interest groups for strategies’ sake. Rather it attempts to link different types of groups with strategies. The key normative concern being whether certain groups are able to apply more effective strategies than others. Kollman’s (1998) contribution is typical for how the descriptive typology was then transformed into an explanatory one. When studying the impact of salience on whether interest groups lobby within parliament or choose a media strategy, he introduces the different types of interest groups as control variables. He does not provide a theoretical explanation for why he would expect different types of interest groups to apply different strategies. Binderkrantz et al. (2014) then explained public interest groups’ preference for outsider strategies by their ability “to make claims of broad public appeal”, in addition to their inability to access the bureaucracy. The implicit assumption they make is that public support, understood as a variable, loads more heavily on public interest groups than on business interest groups. It is thus important to point out that the type of interest group in itself is not an explanatory variable, but refers to the type of interest a group represents. Any interest group’s ability to employ a certain strategy depends on its “background characteristics” (Baroni et al. 2014). That is, whether it has, amongst others, paying members, public support for its advocated policy solution, financial resources, technical information. On average, certain characteristics might be more present in certain types. However, when looking at a particular policy process it is important to bear in mind that there is no “straightforward” (Kollman 1998, 90) connection between the type of interest represented and the strategy chosen.¹⁰

⁹ This is an observation also made by Dür and De Bièvre (Dür and De Bièvre 2007, 6) who point out that “in extreme cases, such [diffuse] interests can influence political outcomes only through elections as they are unable to overcome collective action problems”.

¹⁰ Dür and Mateo (2013), for instance, show the apparently counter-intuitive finding that public interest groups do not engage in more outside lobbying as their financial resources increase. However, this might be due to the fact that a significant fraction of public interest groups do not actually rely on membership fees in order to survive. Hence, these groups do not face more pressure on behalf of their members and increased resources might actually entail more inside lobbying. Intra-group variation in certain background characteristics might thus lead to confusing results if this is not accounted for. Binderkrantz et al. (2014) put forward this same “logic of membership” in order to explain why public interest groups are more present within the media venue.

3. INTEREST GROUPS IN SWITZERLAND

Mahoney and Baumgartner (2008) point out that if we wish to understand interest group strategies, we must not only consider interest groups themselves, but also the institutions and issues which structure their behavior. The degree of formal inclusion of interest groups in policy-making, for instance through extra-parliamentary committees, can be considered such an institutional variable. The ability of parliament to shape public policy, rather than merely ratifying governmental bills, is a further one. In Switzerland, both of these variables have undergone significant change during the past 20 years. In the following, we will trace the main developments having changed the institutional context within which interest groups operate strategically.

A. THE TRADITIONAL CORPORATIST MODEL

The system of interest representation in Switzerland prior to the 1990s used to be characterized by a strong domination of peak economic associations, in particular peak business associations. Mach (2006, 94–106) qualifies Switzerland as a “liberal-conservative” version of democratic corporatism. In the absence of a strong central state and a unified workers’ movement, peak business interest associations have been the extension of the state, as concerns both policy preparation and implementation, since the end of the 19th century. During the second part of the 1930s, peak trade unions have been integrated into this “structure of concertation”, however, always playing second fiddle behind a bourgeois front uniting both domestic-oriented and export-oriented industrial sectors, as well as the main farmers’ association. According to Mach, this coalition has been remarkably resilient throughout the entire 20th century. Even the conjunction of inflation and stagnation in the 1970s did not topple this alliance. This “asymmetric” case of democratic corporatism guaranteed peak business associations a privileged access to the political system. Moreover, domination of this bourgeois front was exacerbated through the existence of the referendum, permitting the correction of any parliamentary caprice. As a consequence, parliament was considered only a marginal actor in Swiss politics. Analyzing the most important decision-making processes between 1971 and 1976, Kriesi (1980, 310) found that the pre-parliamentary phase was deemed considerably more important than the parliamentary phase. Legislation was largely determined by the negotiations between corporatist interest groups and bureaucrats in the pre-parliamentary phase. Their power was further exacerbated by the fact that negotiations often took place within the informal, low-salient context of extra-parliamentary committees (see Culpepper 2011). The earlier an interest group could intervene during the policy-making process, the more influence it could exert. Moreover, Mach (2014, 419) points out that members of parliament often owed a double allegiance to both their political party and corporatist interest groups, in addition to the organic ties already existing between political parties and peak associations. Parliament did not just stand in the shadow of corporatist arrangements within the pre-parliamentary phase; it was itself dominated by corporatist actors.

B. THE REVIVAL OF PARLIAMENT

The 1990s, however, saw a certain revival of parliament, which can be attributed to a set of three factors: (1) the introduction of permanent committees, (2) larger indemnities for the holding of parliamentary office, and (3) increasing polarization and hence unstable majorities within parliament.

(1) In 1991, the committee system of the Swiss parliament was fundamentally revised. Whereas prior to the reform most issues had been treated by ad-hoc non-specialized committees, the new system

introduced nine permanent legislative committees. The number of members of parliament allowed to take seat in these commissions was regulated.¹¹ Moreover, as they have become thematically specialized, the committees' area of responsibility is largely analogue to the administrative departments (Lüthi 1997, 40–43). Lüthi (1997) analyzed whether this reform has made legislative committees more important as compared to the parliamentary plenum and the government. She shows that the committees have become more critical vis-à-vis governmental bills. The share of governmental bills amended by committees has significantly increased since the permanent committees have been introduced (Lüthi 1997, 59–63). Jegher (1999, 92) shows that the parliamentary plenum largely follows its committees when it comes to amending a governmental bill. The increase in governmental bills amended by parliament can hence be attributed, at least partially, to the introduction of permanent committees.¹² Elsewhere Lüthi argues that members of parliament are now able to develop expert knowledge in particular issue areas, enabling them to monitor the development of governmental bills during the pre-parliamentary phase and making them a “serious partner” for government (Lüthi 1996, 30).

(2) Kriesi and Trechsel (2008, 71) note that “the Federal Assembly as a whole lacks time, information and professional competence and is consistently disadvantaged compared with the government and the federal administration”. Pilotti (2012, 178–181), however, shows that monetary compensation for holding parliamentary office has increased since the beginning of the 1990s even though the original parliamentary reform was rejected by the Swiss people in 1992. This allows members of parliament to devote more time to parliamentary work.

(3) Kriesi and Trechsel (2008, 74) argue that more polarized and confrontational politics within parliament have led to “more frequent and more profound amendments by Parliament of government proposals”. This seems rather straightforward, as the partisan composition of the Federal Council no longer mirrors the composition of parliament. Governmental proposals are hence less likely to be waved through by parliament.

Taken together these three factors have strengthened the position of parliament vis-à-vis government and are likely to have contributed to a redefinition of interest group strategies in Switzerland. To this we must add a narrowing of the corporatist channel during the pre-parliamentary phase. In 2005, the Federal Council started a reorganization, which aims at abolishing one third of all extra-parliamentary committees.¹³ The Federal Council argued that the consultation procedure is more suited to guarantee representative and transparent participation of interest groups (see also Rebmann and Mach 2013).¹⁴ Certain authors have also argued that corporatist policy-making has lost importance due to an increased polarization and heterogeneity of interests present within peak associations in the 1990s (Häusermann, Mach, and Papadopoulos 2004; Sciarini 2014).

¹¹ That is, 25 members for committees of the National Council and 13 members for committees of the Council of States.

¹² Jegher (1999, 205–207) observes that the share of governmental bills amended by parliament has increased from 45% in the 1970s to approximately 50% in the 1990s.

¹³ <http://www.admin.ch/bundesrecht/ko/index.html?lang=fr>

¹⁴ Message du Conseil Fédéral, FF 2006 9045, Explications relatives à la loi sur l'organisation du gouvernement et de l'administration, Projet mis en consultation: http://www.admin.ch/ch/f/gg/pc/documents/1418/Bericht_f.pdf

C. THE REDEFINITION OF INTEREST GROUP STRATEGIES

The findings presented in the previous subsection foreshadow Sciarini's finding that the pre-parliamentary phase has lost importance as compared to the parliamentary phase (Sciarini 2014, 122). He also observes a shift in the balance of power between interest groups and political parties in favor of the latter. He considers this a correlate of the observed decline in power of the pre-parliamentary phase. This ignores though that political parties are also included in the pre-parliamentary phase. Any consultation includes also all the major political parties, which do not shy away from handing in elaborate comments. It follows that political parties should have lost power as well. In other words, the decline of the pre-parliamentary phase does not necessarily entail the decline of the actors engaged in this phase. Most importantly, however, the decline of corporatist policy-making cannot be deduced from a shift in power from interest groups to political parties in the first place. Rather it must be established whether corporatist interest groups are no longer the main interlocutor of the state, be this the government or parliament. Thus, we do not consider the increased importance of the parliament as evidence for a decrease in corporatist policy-making. Rather we identify a need to study interest group strategies in the Swiss parliament, employing the conceptual toolkit provided by the neo-pluralist literature presented above.

Binderkrantz (2008) applies the concepts of inside and outside lobbying, emanating from the neo-pluralist literature (Kollman 1998), to the study of interest groups with corporative resources.¹⁵ Within the corporatist literature there is not much reference to strategic behavior on behalf of corporatist interest groups. The literature mainly points to their institutionalized integration into extra-parliamentary committees by the state. However, the power of corporatist interest groups does not solely derive from the fact that they enjoy official recognition by the state. This official recognition, the license to represent, is also the consequence of corporatist interest groups' ability to discipline their member organizations. Hence, even if the official corporatist channel breaks down, corporatist interest groups do not lose all of their power resources. If corporatist interest groups are not considered an extension of the state, one becomes more attentive to their ability to act strategically.

¹⁵ Hereby she refers to the ability of business groups to control societal production and of trade unions to paralyze society through strikes (Binderkrantz 2008, 178).

4. RESEARCH QUESTIONS

Taking into account the changes in the institutional context outlined above, the general research question is stated as follows:

Which strategies of influence do different types of interest groups apply in the Swiss political system?

As pointed out above (Section 2c), launching popular initiatives and referendums can be considered an outsider strategy, or “public-related strategy” (Kriesi, Tresch, and Jochum 2007, 58). Therefore, a distinction is made between two main strategies following the insider-outsider dichotomy: parliamentary strategies, and the direct democracy strategy. This allows breaking down the general research question into three more tractable ones:

- A. Which strategies of influence do different types of interest groups apply within the parliamentary venue?
- B. Which strategies of influence do different types of interest groups apply within the direct democratic venue?
- C. Which venues are privileged by different types of interest groups?

In the following, these three research questions will be presented more thoroughly. The first two questions focus on “intra-venue” lobbying strategies, pursued *within* parliament and direct democracy respectively. We are interested in whether different groups act similarly within the same venue. The third question focuses on “multiple-venue” lobbying strategies, the choice *between* administration, parliament and direct democracy.

A. MOVING TOWARDS PARLIAMENTARY CORPORATISM?

Rommetvedt et al. (2014) show how interest groups, both corporatist insider and outsiders, react to the narrowing of the corporatist channel of participation and the strengthening of parliament by increased lobbying of both legislators and civil servants. It is important to point out that they consider the decline of corporatism and the revival of parliaments as two distinct, but interrelated phenomena. The decline of corporatism refers mainly to the downscaling of the corporatist committee system. While apparently also driven by a wish to render public policy-making more transparent and regulated, the decrease in the number of corporatist committees is actually a consequence of government having become less able “to offer policy concessions to interest groups in exchange for political support” (Rommetvedt et al. 2014, 11). The revival of parliament implies the decline of corporatist committees in the pre-parliamentary phase. However, Rommetvedt et al. do not actually put into question the power resources of corporatist actors; they wish to find out how corporatist actors deal with the downscaling of the committee system, without actually making a claim about them having lost importance in the policy-making process. The revival of the parliament does not necessarily imply the decline of corporatist actors, rather of corporatist arrangements with government. This allows them to analyze how corporatist actors “deal with corporatism in decline”, as suggested by the title of their article.

In the Swiss case, Häusermann et al. (2004, 53–54), for instance, show that the recent unemployment insurance reform in Switzerland was a compromise between political parties and the social partners, i.e. corporatist IGs, within parliament. Christiansen and Rommetvedt (1999) would call this an instance of “parliamentary corporatism”. The strengthening of parliament does not sap the power of corporatist IGs. Rather the loss of power is due to an increasing heterogeneity of

interests present within encompassing corporatist IGs (Mach 2006). If we attribute the decline of corporatist actors to the decline of corporatist committees, then we ignore whether and how corporatist actors dealt with the narrowing of the traditional corporatist channel.

Thus, rather than assuming that the diminishing importance of the pre-parliamentary phase automatically entails a diversification of interests present within parliament, *we ask whether there has indeed been a pluralization of interests over the past 20 years within parliament* (Q.A1).¹⁶ Taking into account the revival of parliament, we expect all types of interest groups to have increased their activities within parliament. However, facing an increased heterogeneity of interests amongst their members, corporatist interest groups are less able to replicate their former dominance in the administrative arena within parliament (H.A1). Alternatively, we hypothesize that corporatist IGs continue to dominate parliament, as they remain powerful actors with the capacity to launch referendums. This question, situated on the macro level, will be answered using quantitative data stemming from the registry of ties to interest groups of MPs provided by Parliament services (see Section 5).

In light of the revival of parliament, it is of central importance to consider ties between IGs and MPs. In fact, research on formal ties between MPs and IGs has been very scarce.¹⁷ By formal ties we mean MPs actually occupying a leading position within an IG. This scarcity of research is probably due to IGs being explicitly defined as not promoting candidates for elective office in order to distinguish them from political parties. However, in most European countries there are no incompatibilities with parliamentary mandates (Liebert 1995, 417). MPs can be both representatives of a certain constituency as well as representatives of IGs. These two tasks do not necessarily need to be considered incongruent. Engagement within a particular IG can be very well in the interest of a particular constituency. We question whether IGs succeed in gaining access to parliamentary committees via MPs.¹⁸ These committees are concerned with the detailed legislative work, preparing the deliberations within the National Council and the Council of States. It has been shown that these committees strengthened the position of parliament vis-à-vis government (Lüthi 1996; Lüthi 1997). Of course, any MP having both ties to IGs and a seat within a parliamentary committee grants these IGs access to the committee. However, this access might be irrelevant unless there is a topical match between the issues treated by the IG and the committee. For example, an IG working on energy issues will find it not very helpful to be represented within the Defense Committee. The refined research question can thus be stated as follows: *do IGs gain access to relevant committees through MPs?* (Q.A2) Along the lines of Hall and Deardorff, we consider formalized ties between IGs and MPs as formalized legislative subsidies, “a matching grant of costly policy information, political

¹⁶ This question can perhaps be extended to the administration by analyzing the profession and ties to interest groups of the members of extra-parliamentary committees.

¹⁷ In the Swiss case, Bruderer (2005, 182–184) analyzed the ties held by all MPs in 2004. She finds that MPs in powerful positions within parliament, e.g. presidents of committees or parliamentary groups, hold more ties than their fellow MPs. Perhaps these MPs hold powerful positions precisely because they possess a rich “portfolio” of ties to IGs. But, her findings could also be indicative of interest groups strategically co-opting MPs holding powerful positions.

¹⁸ Lüthi (1997, 98–101) has shown that the “fitness for interest representation” varies across committees. In fact, members of the Committees for Economic Affairs and Taxation (CEAT) of both chambers display the highest percentage of “relevant” ties to interest groups. That is, interest groups which are active with same policy area as the committee itself. However, Lüthi does not detail the presence of different types of interest groups.

intelligence, and labor to enterprises of strategically selected legislators” (Hall and Deardorff 2006, 69). IGs are assumed not to establish formal ties with legislators having incompatible preferences. Ties to IGs allow MPs to maintain, develop and certify expertise in various policy areas. We hence hypothesize that IGs succeed in gaining access to relevant parliamentary committees as they enable MPs to maintain, develop and certify competence in a given policy area (H.A2). Again relying on the registry of ties to interest groups of MPs, it will be established whether there is a thematic link between the portfolio of ties of a given MP and his or her committee affiliation. Moreover, it will be established whether interest groups actively recruit MPs during tenure of office.

The last question raises a further one. *If IGs are indeed able to gain access to legislative committees, are certain types of IGs more able to do so than others (Q.A3)?* Armingeon (2011, 179) claims that the demise of corporatist arrangements within the pre-parliamentary phase cannot be considered as evidence for the decline of corporatist policy-making as such, as similar corporatist arrangements might resurface within parliament. He underlines the corporatist character of certain committees when he states that “in 2010 the parliamentary commission on economy and taxes in the Swiss parliament – arguably one of the most important and powerful parliamentary commissions [sic] – is composed of members of leading representatives of interest groups representing the workforce, small and medium enterprises, farmers, employers and big business” (Armingeon 2011, 179). If we find, according to our first research question (Q.A1), that there has been indeed a process of pluralization of interests present within parliament, it will be interesting to see whether certain committees have not undergone the same process.

From a theoretical perspective, it is not clear what to expect. Sciarini (2014, 131, note 24) claims that “the view that interest groups could compensate for their power loss in the pre-parliamentary phase by an increased influence in (and on) the parliamentary phase is not supported by my measure of reputational power”. If we construe this as evidence against the compensation hypothesis, then we expect all parliamentary committees to have undergone the same process of pluralization observed on the level of the parliament. However, while corporatist IGs might have not been able to compensate all of their power loss, they might have still been able to compensate some of it. As Sciarini’s measure cannot disaggregate between “power in administration” and “power in parliament” of IGs, we cannot rely on his findings to emit a hypothesis. In fact, it seems unlikely that no compensation has occurred at all. Binderkrantz (2008, 178) argues that corporatist IGs draw their power from their “ability to affect the economy as well as the production of public service”. While an increasing heterogeneity of interests both within trade unions and peak business associations might indeed account for most of the power loss observed, Oesch (2011) argues that unions have been able to counter the shrinking of their membership basis through organizational and programmatic renewal. Hence, we expect corporatist IGs to have been able to compensate some of their loss in power in the pre-parliamentary phase through privileged integration into parliamentary committees (H.A3).

A last line of inquiry concerns debates within plenary sessions of the Council of State and the National Council. *Do ties to relevant IGs enable parliamentarians to intervene during plenary debates (Q.A4)?* Again here the concept of access is central, as we mean accessing the parliamentary debate. As mentioned, ties to IGs do not necessarily need to be considered incongruent with constituency preferences. MPs might be voted into parliament precisely because their interest links manifest some of their policy positions. Hence, when legislators rise to speak in parliament, it is difficult to assess whether they do so on behalf of an IG, their constituency, or both. From a theoretical perspective,

we again borrow from Hall and Deardorff (2006), as we consider IGs to give legislators the means allowing them to make compelling interventions during plenary debates. If legislators rely on IGs to furnish them with costly policy information, then it should be rather difficult to make parliamentary interventions without the backing of IGs. We do not hypothesize that IGs speak through parliamentarians; rather we wish to establish whether parliamentarians rely on IGs in order to make cogent interventions. Thus, we do not question the rationale of intervention, as Bailer (2011) has done concerning parliamentary questions. Rather we hypothesize that ties to relevant IGs represent a necessary condition for interventions of MPs during plenary debates (H.A4). Here we will rely on the analysis of a set of most different policy issues. We will be able to trace whether interventions made during plenary debates can be, at least partly, attributed to the existence of certain ties of interest groups.

B. MOVING TOWARDS MEDIATIZED DIRECT DEMOCRACY?

As Gerber (1999, 4) points out “direct legislation’s early advocates argued that allowing citizens to make policy would shift the balance of power from narrow economic interests to broader-based concerns”. Here we have, therefore, a political institution answering directly to problems of bias in representation of different interests. The shadow of the referendum and popular initiative can be considered as a further mechanism of control within the principal-agent relationship between the people and the parliament. Some authors have even argued that direct democracy renders a political system inefficient as it often annuls lengthy parliamentary work (for a discussion and evidence against this claim, see Trechsel and Sciarini 1998; Papadopoulos 1995; Papadopoulos 2001). The debate over the introduction of these plebiscitary elements revolves around questions such as whether direct democracy actually increases citizen participation in general¹⁹, whether it oversimplifies politics as it reduces any debate to a yes or no question, and of course, whether it represents yet another tool for narrow economic interests to get what they want.²⁰ The last point of debate has been treated extensively by Gerber (1999). She speaks of the “populist paradox”, that is, the “alleged transformation of direct legislation from a tool of regular citizens to a tool of special interests”. In this second research axis, we seek to contribute to this last debate, whilst acknowledging that politics has become increasingly mediatized. As media logic increasingly dictates political behavior, are direct democratic tools still used for political reasons (achieving influence, provoking public debate)?

Existing research concerning the use of direct democratic tools by IGs has mainly focused on the US context (however, Obinger 1998). The main question addressed is which types of IGs make use of direct democratic tools. Its main findings are that (1) business IGs launch more referendums than popular initiatives (Gerber 1999), (2) public IGs launch more popular initiatives than referendums (Gerber 1999), and (3) public IGs launch more popular initiatives than business IGs (Donovan et al. 1998; Boehmke 2005b; Boehmke 2005a).

Building on the US literature, *we ask which types of interest groups make use of direct democracy in Switzerland* (Q.B1). We are interested in whether there has been a pluralization of interest groups

¹⁹ See, for instance, (Tolbert, McNeal, and Smith 2003).

²⁰ Only recently, the German Bundestag has discussed two parliamentary initiatives by the social-democratic party aiming to introduce direct-democratic elements on the federal level and made “daring more direct democracy” part of its political program. See, http://bundestag.de/dokumente/textarchiv/2013/45282323_kw24_de_volksentscheid/212790.

making use of direct democratic tools over the course of the past 30 years. We expect corporatist actors to increasingly use direct democratic tools in order to compensate for their diminishing role in the pre-parliamentary phase as well as in parliament (H.B1).²¹ This hypothesis is a corollary to H.A1, the opposite process of the pluralization of interest groups within parliament. Alternatively, if corporatist actors have been able to transpose their dominance into parliament, we expect no changes in the use of direct democratic tools by different types of IGs. In order to answer this question, we will rely on quantitative data.

Since the beginning of the 1990s, we can observe a stark increase in the use of both the referendum and popular initiative.²² This increase seems to suggest that interest groups have made more use of the “direct democracy strategy”. There appear to be two reasons for this increased use. First, Trechsel and Sciarini (1998, 103–104) have shown that the “the percentage of bills that were actually attacked through the optional referendum among all legislative acts subject to this institution remains highly stable at a very low level”. Their data covers the period from 1947 to 1995. They also note that “one reason for the intensified use of *direct democratic institutions* certainly has to do with the *general complexification of modern politics*” (Trechsel and Sciarini 1998, 105; emphases added). That is, the increased use of *both* the optional referendum *and* the popular initiative might be the consequence of the same “general complexification of modern politics”.²³ Second, Vatter (2000, 185–186) argues that “the less “perfectly” a consensual system is organized, the sooner optional referendums and initiatives will be used by underrepresented minorities as alternative instruments of power distribution”. Polarization within parliament should hence lead to an increased use of direct democratic tools. In light of a less consensual Swiss government and a more polarized parliament, an increased relative use of both the optional referendum and the popular initiative seems to suggest itself.²⁴

A further alternative hypothesis could be related to an increased mediatization of politics. Landerer (2013, 252) states that “in a (hypothetical) world where media companies operate exclusively as commercial firms and news selection is not based on normative (party) agenda, political actors are not automatically guaranteed their presence in daily news coverage if they merely state complex facts and problem”. In other words, substantive coverage of political issues does not pay, hence the more technical, less controversial aspects of politics are covered less by the media. However, if

²¹ By consequence, it is also expected that corporatist interest group emit more favorable voting recommendations in the 1990s and 2000s, as compared to the 1970s and 1980s.

²² Whereas in the 1980s 24 popular initiatives were launched, the number has increased to 44 during the 2000s. Concerning the referendum, the respective counts are 10 and 28. Calculation based on the *SWISSVOTES* database.

²³ Concerning the optional referendum, this connection can easily be established relating the number of referendums to the number of legislative bills (and decrees) produced. Legislative production is thus considered an indicator of the higher complexity of modern politics. Popular initiatives, on the other hand, cannot be put into relation with actually produced legislative bills. Rather they are the response to non-produced legislative bills. Therefore, a correlation between the number of parliamentary initiatives and motions, which did not transform into legislation, and the number of popular initiatives, should be observed.

²⁴ Strictly speaking, polarization within parliament should lead to an increased *relative* use of direct democratic tools. As concerns the referendum, the percentage of bills actually attacked should increase. An increase in the absolute number of optional referendums launched is not in itself evidence for an increased use of the referendum, as it could merely constitute the consequence of the “general complexification of politics”.

media represents the main source of information between the governors and the governed²⁵, political actors cannot connect to the public without passing through mass media. This leads politicians to adapt their behavior according to audience-oriented market logic. They adopt a more conflictive attitude in order to make it to the news (Brants et al. 2009, 7). Governing becomes campaigning. Of course, the behavior of any political actor cannot be reduced to either audience-oriented market logic or purely normative logic. Only the most-cynical politician is a purely “problem-seeking” individual. But, the mediatization of politics refers to political actors’ behavior following more and more the maxim of electoral success.

Whether and how the mediatization of politics impacts the behavior of interests groups has been only very scarcely studied so far. Häusermann et al. (2004, 39) partly attribute the increased difficulty of corporatist actors to find policy compromises to increasingly mediatized politics. If corporatist interest groups wish to demonstrate activity to their members (and thereby ensure their survival), they must take a contentious stance during negotiations. Instead of seeking policy compromises, interest groups become mainly preoccupied with campaigning for members. Kriesi et al. (2007) show that interest groups cannot afford to eschew “public-related” strategies in an audience democracy.

Writing right at the start of the major increase in the use of direct-democratic tools, Epple-Gass (1991, 162–163) detects a “change in function”²⁶ of popular initiatives launched by public interest groups related to the new social movements. He mentions that the Group Switzerland without an Army (GSoA/GSsA) launched its initiative aiming at the abolishment of the army for the sole reason of provoking a political discussion and raising awareness. While criticized by some (Häfliger 2013), it can be argued that even when used in order to merely raise awareness, the use of the popular initiative still follows the imperative of problem-solving, of addressing a societal problem. Pushing the idea of functional differentiation of the popular initiative, *we ask whether the mediatization of politics turns direct democracy into a venue for membership recruitment and maintenance of interest groups* (Q.B3). What appears to be a strategy of influence might actually be a strategy of survival.²⁷ We will not be able to establish whether “survival strategies” have indeed become more common over the course of the past 20 years. This would require a diachronic analysis of the motivations behind IG leaders’ decisions to launch referendums and initiatives. But, what should be observed if the use of direct democratic tools is compared among different types of interest groups? If the logic of membership really does inform the use of direct democratic tools, does it do so in the same way for different types of interest groups? This question is answered with the following tentative hypothesis: in comparison to public IGs relying on donations by private foundations, public IGs relying on membership fees should engage more *intensely* in direct democratic campaigns (H.B3). Or, public interest groups should engage more intensely in direct democratic campaigns, as compared to

²⁵ That is, when politics are “mediated” (not to be confounded with “mediatized”) (see Strömbäck 2008, 229–231).

²⁶ The term “change in function” might be slightly confusing. Of course, popular initiatives occasionally still command majority backing, and are launched with the explicit aim of doing so. The term functional differentiation is preferred here.

²⁷ Without explicitly linking her reasoning to the mediatization, Binderkrantz (2008, 173) points to the link between media and membership when she states that “public interest groups can demonstrate a high level of engagement to their diffuse membership when relying on publicly visible strategies”. However, when running a regression, Binderkrantz et al. (2014, 16) do not disentangle between public IGs seeking to demonstrate a high level of engagement and public IGs drawing their strength from the general public’s shared concern for their cause.

identity groups, which can ensure their survival through the provision of selective benefits. This question could be answered relying both on rather quantitative and qualitative data (see Section 5).

C. CHOOSING BATTLEGROUND: ADMINISTRATION, PARLIAMENT AND DIRECT DEMOCRACY

In this third research axis, the focus is put on the strategic choice of being active either within the pre-parliamentary (administrative), parliamentary or direct democratic venue, or all of them. So far, no studies have tackled this choice. Gerber (1999) was primarily concerned with the choice of different direct democratic mechanisms by different group types. She did not analyze the choice between the direct democratic and the parliamentary venue. Two recent studies tackle the question of venue choice, albeit without taking into consideration the direct democratic venue.

First, Boehmke et al. (2013, 20), focusing on the US, analyze the choice of lobbying either in parliament or administration, or both. For different types of interest groups, they have calculated the percentage of groups active only in administration, only in parliament, and in both venues. They find, for instance, 51.3% of all business groups to be active only within parliament, 5.1% are active only within administration and 43.6% are active in both the administration and parliament. For citizen groups, the respective percentages are similar. Boehmke et al. hence point out that “the comparison across venues demonstrates a somewhat surprising similarity between citizen and business groups: along with institutions, citizen and business groups are the only categories of groups [...] for which a majority lobby just the legislature rather than both venues” (Boehmke, Gailmard, and Patty 2013, 19).

Before continuing, the difference between two related concepts must be explained: “patterns of representation” and “venue choice patterns”. First, patterns of representation refer to the relative presence of different types of interest groups in a particular venue.²⁸ Second, venue choice patterns refer to how the interest groups within a particular category spread their activities across venues. An example was given in the preceding paragraph. These two concepts are interrelated. If venue choice were the same for all group categories, there would be no variation in patterns of representation across venues. Moreover, any bias in mobilization of interests would hence extend in an identical way across all venues and arenas. It also entails that if there is indeed variation of patterns of representation across venues, this must be due to different IG categories making different venue choices.

This leads to the second recent study tackling the question of venue choice. Binderkrantz et al. (2014, 13) observe different patterns of representation when comparing the media venue to the parliamentary and administrative ones. Concretely, they find business dominance to be weaker in the media arena. They attribute this finding to business groups’ difficulty in making claims of broad public appeal. When faced with the choice parliament/administration versus media, business interest groups prefer the former to the latter.

Focusing on the three main venues, *it is asked whether there are differences in patterns of venue choice across IG types* (Q.C1). Taking into account the similarities between the direct democratic

²⁸ These patterns of representation have been around at least since Scholzman’s analysis of bias in the American system of interest representation (Scholzman 1984, 1012). Patterns of representation and patterns of venue choice can be depicted in a single graph (see Eising 2007, 394).

venue and the media arena, both venues being characterized by a tight link to the general public, we expect variation in patterns of venue choice across IG types. In comparison to public interest groups, business interest groups and trade unions should display a lower percentage of interest groups active in both venues (H.C1).

The numbers presented by Boehmke et al. (2013) represent average numbers as they have analyzed patterns of representation and venue choice in 76 different policy areas. Due to the absence of lobby registry in Switzerland, a more pragmatic approach must be chosen. Patterns of venue choice will be analyzed across six different policy processes pertaining to four different policy areas (see Section 5).

5. METHODS

In order to answer the research questions raised in the previous sections, we will rely on both a macro-level and micro-level analysis. The former allows keeping an eye on the big picture of interest group activities in the Swiss political system, and is based on rather quantitative data. The micro-level analysis allows analyzing interest group strategies as they unfold within concrete policy-making processes. It is complementary to the macro-analysis in two ways. First, it allows tracing the activities of particular interest groups across several venues during the course of a particular policy-making process. Second, it allows a more fine-grained analysis of interest group activities within particular venues. It relies on both quantitative and qualitative data.

A. MACRO-LEVEL ANALYSIS

The macro-level analysis seeks to establish the presence of different types of interest groups in both the parliamentary and direct democratic venue. It does not relate this presence to any particular policy process, but allows gaining a bird's eye view on the presence of different types of interest groups in the Swiss political system since the beginning of the 1990s. It concerns the question of the pluralization of interests within both the parliamentary (Q.A1, Q.A2, Q.A3) and direct democratic venues (Q.B1). It allows analyzing the evolution of IG strategies in time.²⁹ These macro-level questions will be answered relying on quantitative data stemming from two different sources. As concerns the parliamentary venue, it will be relied on the registry of ties to interest groups of MPs, provided by the parliamentary service.³⁰ It contains information concerning the presence of MPs within executive, supervisory, advisory and similar committees of Swiss and foreign corporate entities as well as foundations. Data is available since 1985 and hence covers the entire period analyzed. Moreover, the data concerning the years 2000 to 2010 have already been transformed into a database and the interest groups have been coded according to a revised version of the *INTERARENA* coding scheme³¹ used by Binderkrantz et al. (2014). Coding the groups having ties to MPs in 1990 should hence not pose a major problem. Concerning the direct democratic venue, it will be relied on the *SWISSVOTES* database³², which identifies the authors of all optional referendums and popular initiatives since 1898 (Christian and Rielle 2014).³³

B. MICRO-LEVEL ANALYSIS

The micro-level analysis allows closer examination of individual policy processes and is necessary if we are to reach firm conclusions about the presence and strategies of different types of interest groups both within and across venues. Perhaps it will be found that certain IG types, apparently less present in parliament in 2010 than in 1990, are still very much dominant when it comes to enabling interventions of MPs during plenary debates (Q.A4). Perhaps it will also be found that the logic of membership indeed informs the use of direct democratic tools (Q.B2). Public IGs might hence dominate the use of direct democratic tools, as was established in the US context, but they might be

²⁹ If the analysis is extended to the pre-parliamentary (administrative) venue, information concerning the ties to interest groups of the members of extra-parliamentary committees can be obtained from parliamentary services and retrieved from an existing database on the Swiss economic and political elites (see www.unil.ch/elitessuisses).

³⁰ <http://biblio.parlament.ch/e-docs/357435.pdf>

³¹ <http://interarena.dk/files/GroupCatDanishGroups.doc>

³² <http://www.swissvotes.ch/>

³³ When missing, the authors can be identified by looking up the notice announcing the successful completion of the signature gathering for a popular initiative with the Federal Gazette.

more preoccupied with demonstrating activity to their members than actually doing politics. And while we might observe a pluralization of interest groups present within parliament, it will be interesting to find out whether this pluralization also hold for those interest groups active in both venues (Q.C1).

In order to conduct the micro-level analysis, a documentary analysis of six most-different policy processes will be undertaken. As has been pointed out by the “population ecologists” within the study of interest groups, the interest group population varies across different policy areas. This can influence interest group behavior (see Section 1, footnote 1). Therefore, six policy processes pertaining to four different policy areas have been chosen as follows:

Issue area	Policy process
Economic and fiscal issues	Control of executive pay Liberalization of electricity market
Welfare state	Regulation of medicine prices
Rights, law and order	Embryonic stem cell research Simplified naturalization
Environment	Railway infrastructure

The documentary analysis will take into account consultation procedures, transcriptions of parliamentary debates, and official documentation furnished by the referendum and initiative committees. Moreover, in order to supplement this data, interviews with key actors (interest group representatives and civil servants) will be conducted.

Exploratory research has shown that approximately 80 different interest groups have taken part in the consultation procedure concerning the stem cell research act alone. The documentary analyses will allow comparing venue choice patterns of different IG types across different policy processes. It also allows comparing the success of different types of IGs in “activating” MPs during parliamentary debates pertaining to different policy processes. In a similar fashion, the intensity of engagement in direct democratic campaigns can be compared across groups and policy processes. While the sample of policy processes is not representative for the population of issues interest groups work on, some variation concerning issue-related variables can still be introduced and confidence in the generalizability of results increased. Currently, it is foreseen that the micro-level analysis relies on rather quantitative data, derived from the documentary analyses of the different policy processes. However, depending on the quality of the data, the research questions can also be answered relying on more qualitative data. For instance, rather than using descriptive statistics in order to show how different types of IGs succeed in activating MPs during parliamentary debates, particular IGs, representative of larger IG categories, can be compared to each other.

6. TIMETABLE

	2014				2015				2016				2017	
	02-03	04-06	07-09	10-12	01-03	04-06	07-09	10-12	01-03	04-06	07-09	10-12	01-03	04-07
1. Conceptualization														
Thesis proposal	■	■	■											
Literature review	■	■	■	■	■									
Acquisition of methods		■	■				■				■			
2. Data														
Exploratory research	■	■	■											
Documentary analysis			■	■	■	■								
Quantitative data		■	■	■	■									
Interviews							■	■						
3. Analyses														
Data analysis					■	■	■	■	■	■				
4. Drafting														
Drafting (strategies within parliament)											■			
Drafting (strategies within direct democracy)												■		
Drafting (choice between different venues)													■	
Revisions														■
5. Valorization														
Conferences/Articles		■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■

7. BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Armingeon, Klaus. 2011. 'A Prematurely Announced Death?'. In *Switzerland in Europe: Continuity and Change in the Swiss Political Economy*, edited by Christine Trampusch and André Mach, 165–85. Routledge Advances in European Politics 72. London: Routledge.
- Bailer, Stefanie. 2011. 'People's Voice or Information Pool? The Role Of, and Reasons For, Parliamentary Questions in the Swiss Parliament'. *The Journal of Legislative Studies* 17 (3): 302–14. doi:10.1080/13572334.2011.595123.
- Baroni, Laura, Brendan J. Carroll, Adam William Chalmers, Luz Maria Muñoz Marquez, and Anne Rasmussen. 2014. 'Defining and Classifying Interest Groups'. *Interest Groups & Advocacy* 3 (2): 141–59.
- Baumgartner, Frank R., Jeffrey M. Berry, Marie Hojnacki, Beth L. Leech, and David C. Kimball. 2009. *Lobbying and Policy Change: Who Wins, Who Loses, and Why*. Chicago ; London: The University of Chicago Press.
- Baumgartner, Frank R., and Beth L. Leech. 1998. *Basic Interests: The Importance of Groups in Politics and in Political Science*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Binderkrantz, Anne Skorkjær. 2008. 'Different Groups, Different Strategies: How Interest Groups Pursue Their Political Ambitions'. *Scandinavian Political Studies* 31 (2): 173–200.
- Binderkrantz, Anne Skorkjær, Peter Munk Christiansen, and Helene Helboe Pedersen. 2014. 'Interest Group Access to the Bureaucracy, Parliament, and the Media'. *Governance*, n/a – n/a. doi:10.1111/gove.12089.
- Blom-Hansen, Jens. 2001. 'Organized Interests and the State: A Disintegrating Relationship? Evidence from Denmark'. *European Journal of Political Research* 39 (3): 391–416. doi:10.1023/A:1011071828548.
- Boehmke, Frederick J. 2005a. *The Indirect Effect of Direct Legislation: How Institutions Shape Interest Group Systems*. Ohio State University Press.
- . 2005b. 'Sources of Variation in the Frequency of Statewide Initiatives: The Role of Interest Group Populations'. *Political Research Quarterly* 58 (4): 565–75. doi:10.1177/106591290505800404.
- Boehmke, Frederick J., Sean Gailmard, and John W. Patty. 2013. 'Business as Usual: Interest Group Access and Representation across Policy-Making Venues'. *Journal of Public Policy* 33 (01): 3–33.
- Bouwen, Pieter. 2004. 'The Logic of Access to the European Parliament: Business Lobbying in the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs'. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 42 (3): 473–95. doi:10.1111/j.0021-9886.2004.00515.x.
- Brants, Kees, Claes De Vreese, Judith Möller, and Philip Van Praag. 2009. 'The Real Spiral of Cynicism? Symbiosis and Mistrust between Politicians and Journalists'. *The International Journal of Press/Politics*.
- Braun, Caelesta. 2012. 'The Captive or the Broker? Explaining Public Agency–Interest Group Interactions'. *Governance* 25 (2): 291–314.
- Bruderer, Pascale. 2005. 'Lobbyisten im Ratssaal'. In *Lobbying in der Schweiz: Partikularinteressen unter der Bundeskuppel*, edited by Othmar Baeriswyl. Villars-sur-Glâne: Verlag Mediata sa.
- Christian, Bolliger, and Yvan Rielle. 2014. 'Über das Projekt Swissvotes'. In *SWISSVOTES - Datenbank der eidgenössischen Volksabstimmungen*. <http://www.swissvotes.ch>.

- Christiansen, Peter Munk, and Hilmar Rommetvedt. 1999. 'From Corporatism to Lobbyism?—Parliaments, Executives, and Organized Interests in Denmark and Norway'. *Scandinavian Political Studies* 22 (3): 195–220.
- Cook, Constance Ewing. 1984. 'Participation in Public Interest Groups Membership Motivations'. *American Politics Research* 12 (4): 409–30. doi:10.1177/1532673X8401200402.
- Culpepper, Pepper D. 2011. *Quiet Politics and Business Power: Corporate Control in Europe and Japan*. Cambridge University Press.
- Donovan, Todd, Shaun Bowler, David McCuan, and Ken Fernandez. 1998. 'Contending Players and Strategies: Opposition Advantages in Initiative Campaigns'. In *Citizens as Legislators: Direct Democracy in the United States*, edited by Shaun Bowler, Todd Donovan, and Caroline J. Tolbert, 80–104. Columbus: Ohio State University Press.
- Dür, Andreas. 2008. 'Interest Groups in the European Union: How Powerful Are They?'. *West European Politics* 31 (6): 1212–30. doi:10.1080/01402380802372662.
- Dür, Andreas, and Dirk De Bièvre. 2007. 'The Question of Interest Group Influence'. *Journal of Public Policy* 27 (01): 1–12. doi:10.1017/S0143814X07000591.
- Dür, Andreas, and Gemma Mateo. 2013. 'Gaining Access or Going Public? Interest Group Strategies in Five European Countries'. *European Journal of Political Research* 52 (5): 660–86.
- Eising, Rainer. 2007. 'The Access of Business Interests to EU Institutions: Towards Élite Pluralism?'. *Journal of European Public Policy* 14 (3): 384–403. doi:10.1080/13501760701243772.
- Epple-Gass, Ruedi. 1991. 'Neue Formen Politischer Mobilisierung: (k)eine Herausforderung Der Schweizerischen Demokratie?'. *SVPW Jahrbuch* 31: 151–71. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.5169/seals-172842.
- Gerber, Elisabeth R. 1999. *The Populist Paradox: Interest Group Influence and the Promise of Direct Legislation*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Gray, Virginia, and David Lowery. 1996. *The Population Ecology of Interest Representation : Lobbying Communities in the American States*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Häfliger, Markus. 2013. '«Wir werden von Volksinitiativen richtiggehend überschwemmt»: Jean-Daniel Gerbers Vorschläge gegen die Initiativenflut'. *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, October 22, sec. Schweiz. <http://www.nzz.ch/aktuell/schweiz/wir-werden-von-volksinitiativen-richtiggehend-ueberschwemmt-1.18171296>.
- Hall, Richard L., and Alan V. Deardorff. 2006. 'Lobbying as Legislative Subsidy'. *American Political Science Review* 100 (01): 69–84. doi:10.1017/S0003055406062010.
- Hassenteufel, Patrick. 1990. 'Où En Est Le Paradigme Corporatiste ?'. *Politix* 3 (12): 75–81. doi:10.3406/polix.1990.1427.
- Häusermann, Silja, André Mach, and Yannis Papadopoulos. 2004. 'From Corporatism to Partisan Politics: Social Policy Making under Strain in Switzerland'. *Swiss Political Science Review* 10 (2): 33–59.
- Holyoke, Thomas T. 2003. 'Choosing Battlegrounds: Interest Group Lobbying across Multiple Venues'. *Political Research Quarterly* 56 (3): 325–36.
- Jegher, Annina. 1999. *Bundesversammlung und Gesetzgebung: der Einfluss von institutionellen, politischen und inhaltlichen Faktoren auf die Gesetzgebungstätigkeit der Eidgenössischen Räte*. Berner Studien zur Politikwissenschaft, Bd. 7. Bern [etc.]: P. Haupt.
- Jordan, Grant. 2000. 'The Process of Government and The Governmental Process'. *Political Studies* 48 (4): 788–801. doi:10.1111/1467-9248.00283.

- Jordan, Grant, Darren Halpin, and William Maloney. 2004. 'Defining Interests: Disambiguation and the Need for New Distinctions?'. *The British Journal of Politics & International Relations* 6 (2): 195–212. doi:10.1111/j.1467-856X.2004.00134.x.
- Jordan, Grant, and William A. Maloney. 2007. *Democracy and Interest Groups: Enhancing Participation?*. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Kollman, Ken. 1998. *Outside Lobbying: Public Opinion and Interest Group Strategies*. Princeton University Press.
- Kriesi, Hanspeter. 1980. *Entscheidungsstrukturen und Entscheidungsprozesse in der Schweizer Politik*. Frankfurt: Campus-Verlag.
- Kriesi, Hanspeter, and Alexandre H. Trechsel. 2008. *The Politics of Switzerland: Continuity and Change in a Consensus Democracy*. Cambridge University Press.
- Kriesi, Hanspeter, Anke Tresch, and Margit Jochum. 2007. 'Going Public in the European Union Action Repertoires of Western European Collective Political Actors'. *Comparative Political Studies* 40 (1): 48–73. doi:10.1177/0010414005285753.
- Landerer, Nino. 2013. 'Rethinking the Logics: A Conceptual Framework for the Mediatization of Politics'. *Communication Theory* 23 (3): 239–58. doi:10.1111/comt.12013.
- Latham, Earl. 1952. *The Group Basis of Politics*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Liebert, Ulrike. 1995. 'Parliamentary Lobby Regimes'. *Parliaments and Majority Rule in Western Europe*, 407–47.
- Lowery, David, and Holly Brasher. 2004. *Organized Interests and American Government*. McGraw-Hill.
- Lowery, David, and Virginia Gray. 2004. 'A Neopluralist Perspective on Research on Organized Interests'. *Political Research Quarterly* 57 (1): 164–75.
- Lüthi, Ruth. 1996. 'Die Wirkung von institutionellen Reformen dargestellt am Beispiel der Reform des Kommissionensystems der Schweizerischen Bundesversammlung von 1991'. *Swiss Political Science Review* 2 (2): 1–32. doi:10.1002/j.1662-6370.1996.tb00176.x.
- . 1997. *Die Legislativkommissionen der Schweizerischen Bundesversammlung: institutionelle Veränderungen und das Verhalten von Parlamentsmitgliedern*. Berner Studien zur Politikwissenschaft 4. Bern [etc.]: P. Haupt.
- Mach, André. 2006. *La Suisse entre internationalisation et changements politiques internes: la législation sur les cartels et les relations industrielles dans les années 1990*. Analyse des politiques publiques, vol. 6. Zürich: Rüegger.
- . 2014. 'Associations d'intérêt'. In *Manuel de la politique suisse*, edited by Peter Knöpfel, Yannis Papadopoulos, Pascal Sciarini, Adrian Vatter, and Silja Häusermann, 413–34. Zurich: NZZ Verlag.
- Mahoney, Christine. 2007. 'Networking vs. Allying: The Decision of Interest Groups to Join Coalitions in the US and the EU'. *Journal of European Public Policy* 14 (3): 366–83. doi:10.1080/13501760701243764.
- . 2008. *Brussels versus the Beltway: Advocacy in the United States and the European Union*. Georgetown University Press.
- Mahoney, Christine, and Frank Baumgartner. 2008. 'Converging Perspectives on Interest Group Research in Europe and America'. *West European Politics* 31 (6): 1253–73. doi:10.1080/01402380802372688.
- Molina, Oscar, and Martin Rhodes. 2002. 'Corporatism: The Past, Present, and Future of a Concept'. *Annual Review of Political Science* 5 (1): 305–31.

- Obinger, Herbert. 1998. 'Federalism, Direct Democracy, and Welfare State Development in Switzerland'. *Journal of Public Policy* 18 (03): 241–63.
- Oesch, Daniel. 2011. 'Trade Unions and Industrial Relations in Switzerland'. In *Switzerland in Europe: Continuity and Change in the Swiss Political Economy*, edited by Christine Trampusch and André Mach. Routledge Advances in European Politics 72. London: Routledge.
- Olson, Mancur. 1965. *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups*. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.
- Papadopoulos, Yannis. 1995. 'Analysis of Functions and Dysfunctions of Direct Democracy: Top-Down and Bottom-Up Perspectives'. *Politics & Society* 23 (4): 421–48. doi:10.1177/0032329295023004002.
- . 2001. 'How Does Direct Democracy Matter? The Impact of Referendum Votes on Politics and Policy-Making'. *West European Politics* 24 (2): 35–58.
- Pilotti, Andrea. 2012. 'Les parlementaires suisses entre démocratisation et professionnalisation (1910-2010). Biographie collectives des élus fédéraux et réformes du Parlement helvétique.' Lausanne: University of Lausanne.
- Pralle, Sarah B. 2003. 'Venue Shopping, Political Strategy, and Policy Change: The Internationalization of Canadian Forest Advocacy'. *Journal of Public Policy* 23 (3): 233–60.
- . 2010. 'Shopping Around: Environmental Organizations and the Search for Policy Venues'. *Advocacy Organizations and Collective Action*, 177.
- Rebmann, Frédéric, and André Mach. 2013. 'Commissions Extra-Parlementaires Fédérales'. In *Manuel D'administration Publique Suisse*, edited by Andreas Ladner, Jean-Loup Chappelet, Yves Emery, Peter Knöpfel, Luzius Mader, Nils Soguel, and Frédéric Varone. PPUR.
- Rommetvedt, Hilmar, Gunnar Thesen, Peter Munk Christiansen, and Asbjørn Sonne Nørgaard. 2014. 'Coping With Corporatism in Decline and the Revival of Parliament: Interest Group Lobbyism in Denmark and Norway, 1980–2005'. *Comparative Political Studies*. Accessed May 19. doi:10.1177/0010414012453712.
- Salisbury, Robert H. 1969. 'An Exchange Theory of Interest Groups'. *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, 1–32.
- Schattschneider, E. E. 1960. *The Semisovereign People: A Realist's View of Democracy in America*. Hinsdale, Illinois: The Dryden Press.
- Schlozman, Kay Lehman. 1984. 'What Accent the Heavenly Chorus? Political Equality and the American Pressure System'. *The Journal of Politics* 46 (04): 1006–32.
- Schmitter, Philippe C. 1974. 'Still the Century of Corporatism?'. *The Review of Politics* 36 (01): 85–131.
- Schmitter, Philippe C., and Wolfgang Streeck. 1999. *The Organization of Business Interests: Studying the Associative Action of Business in Advanced Industrial Societies*. 99/1. MPIfG discussion paper. <http://www.econstor.eu/handle/10419/43739>.
- Sciarini, Pascal. 2014. 'Eppure Si Muove: The Changing Nature of the Swiss Consensus Democracy'. *Journal of European Public Policy* 21 (1): 116–32. doi:10.1080/13501763.2013.822822.
- Strömbäck, Jesper. 2008. 'Four Phases of Mediatization: An Analysis of the Mediatization of Politics'. *The International Journal of Press/Politics* 13 (3): 228–46.
- Tolbert, Caroline J., Ramona S. McNeal, and Daniel A. Smith. 2003. 'Enhancing Civic Engagement: The Effect of Direct Democracy on Political Participation and Knowledge'. *State Politics & Policy Quarterly* 3 (1): 23–41. doi:10.1177/153244000300300102.

- Trechsel, Alexander H., and Pascal Sciarini. 1998. 'Direct Democracy in Switzerland: Do Elites Matter?'. *European Journal of Political Research* 33 (1): 99–124. doi:10.1111/1475-6765.00377.
- Truman, David B. 1951. *The Governmental Process: Public Interests and Public Opinion*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
- Vatter, Adrian. 2000. 'Consensus and Direct Democracy: Conceptual and Empirical Linkages'. *European Journal of Political Research* 38 (2): 171–92. doi:10.1111/1475-6765.00531.
- Wolfinger, Raymond E. 1960. 'Reputation and Reality in the Study of "Community Power".' *American Sociological Review*, 636–44.